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Over the past two decades the banking sector experienced drastic changes in both
business models and regulation. Securitization as one of the key financial innova-
tions has reformulated banks’ balance sheets and led to a new, so-called “originate-
to-distribute” model. It is no longer necessary for banks to hold loans to mature on
balance sheet. Therefore, banks are more capable of liquidity management and risk
sharing. On the other hand, it challenged the traditional regulation as the collapse of
the securitization markets was at the center of the recent financial crisis in 2007–2009.
Accordingly, Chapters 2 and 3 examine the ex-ante motivation and the ex-post impact
of securitization. Departing from the traditional literature of bank-specific drivers for
securitization, I investigate the tax incentive for securitization in a cross country setting.
In addition, unlike the prior micro studies of the impacts of securitization, for instance,
the adverse selection in the securitization market and so forth, I study the macro impact
of securitization on real economy. Another strand of my research focuses on banking
regulation, especially macroprudential regulation. I am particularly interested in the fact
that banks may ex-ante take risk in anticipation of regulatory forbearance in a systemic
banking crisis and its implication for macroprudential regulation. Consequently, chapter
4 analyzes systemic risk-taking at banks in the presence of “too-many-to-fail” bailout
guarantee. In sum, shedding light on securitization and systemic risk-taking in the
banking sector, this dissertation contributes to the policy debate on bank regulation.
Each chapter is summarized as follows.
Chapter 2 investigates the tax incentive for securitization. Corporate income taxa-
tion, by affecting the after-tax cost of funding, has implications for a bank’s incentive
to securitize. Using a sample of OECD banks over the period 1999–2006, we find that
corporate income taxation led to more securitization at banks that are constrained in
funding markets, while it did not affect securitization at unconstrained banks. This is
consistent with prior theories suggesting that the tax effects of securitization depend on
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the extent to which banks face funding constraints. Our results suggest that current
corporate income tax systems have distorting effects on banks’ securitization decisions.
Chapter 3 analyzes the relationship between country-level securitization and eco-
nomic activity using an international panel. Our findings suggest that securitization
is negatively related to various proxies of economic activity even prior to the crisis
of 2007-2009. We explain this finding by securitization spurring consumption at the
expense of investment and capital formation. Consistent with this, we find that secu-
ritization of household loans is negatively associated with economic activity, whereas
business securitization displays a weak positive association with it, and that household
securitization increases an economy’s consumption-investment ratio. Our results inform
recent initiatives aiming at reviving securitization markets, as they indicate that the
impact of securitization crucially depends on the underlying collateral.
Chapter 4 empirically studies systemic risk taking by banks. Public guarantees in
the event of joint bank failures can result in systemic risk-taking and distort financing
decisions of banks. We argue that the pricing of syndicated loans provides an ideal
laboratory to study such distortions. In the absence of systemic risk-taking, non-
diversifiability of aggregate risk implies that the compensation required for taking on
aggregate risk is higher than for idiosyncratic risk. However, in the presence of public
guarantees, banks have higher benefits from taking on aggregate risk as this leads to
higher correlation across banks. Consistent with the latter, we find that banks charge
lower lending interest rates for aggregate risk than for idiosyncratic risk, controlling for
firm, loan and bank specific factors. Importantly, there is no evidence for systemic risk-
taking for the sample of non-bank lenders who do not benefit from public guarantees.
We also find that effect is larger for smaller and less correlated banks, consistent with
higher a priori benefits from systemic risk-taking for such banks. The evidence provided
suggests that public bail-out policies have significant ex-ante costs by distorting financing
decisions in the economy.
2
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Securitization markets have grown rapidly since the 1990s. Before the outbreak of the
recent financial crisis, securitization had been seen as a blessing to the banking industry
as it provides extra liquidity and improves risk sharing. The dark side of securitization,
for instance misaligned incentive problems and increased systemic risk, however, has
gradually dominated the debate of securitization and financial turmoil1. One central
question arises: Why do banks securitize assets extensively? Although much attention
has already been paid to banks’ business models, the role of taxes is often neglected. In
fact, taxation has been considered as a crucial factor in securitization transactions from
the perspective of practitioners2. Therefore, in this paper we seek to test the effect of
corporate income taxes (henceforth, CIT) on banks’ incentive to securitize assets.
In a typical securitization transaction, an originator (usually a bank) transfers assets
to a special purpose vehicle (henceforth, SPV), which issues asset-backed securities
(henceforth, ABS) to investors (Gorton and Souleles 2007)3. How does corporate income
1Decreased incentives for monitoring and excessive securitization contributed to the increase of
systemic risk and eventually the subprime crisis. Nijskens and Wagner (2011) find evidence that banks
issuing credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) pose greater systemic
risk.
2For example, even though the Indian securitization market grew 15% in the fiscal year 2012, a
pending amendment which made the tax status of pass-through entities uncertain hit the market. “Due
to lack of clarity on tax incidence on pass-through vehicles, the securitization business has come to
a virtual standstill,” said Vimal Bhandari, CEO of Indostar Capital Finance. See “Tax issue hits
securitization market hard” in Indian Express.
3In this paper, the definition of securitization is restricted to the off-balance sheet activity of issuing
ABS. This definition is much narrower than the general concept which includes selling loans, issuing
standby letters of credit and loan commitments.
3
Chapter 2: Does Corporate Income Taxation Affect Securitization?
tax matter in the securitization process? In principle, a bank can finance on-balance sheet
through debt and equity or off-balance sheet through securitization. As corporate income
taxes are levied on corporate profits and equity payments are not tax deductible, a higher
tax rate raises the tax-adjusted cost of equity. By contrast, the cost of off-balance sheet
financing through securitization is assumed to be independent of corporate income taxes.
This is because SPVs are usually structured as tax exempt, which serves to ensure as
far as possible that no extra tax liability arises from securitization transactions. Overall,
corporate income taxes affect funding allocation between on and off-balance sheet. In
particular, a higher tax rate increases the tax-adjusted cost of equity and indirectly favors
securitization financing. Han et al. (2014) show that this mechanism works for a bank
that has substantial loan origination opportunities and limited deposit market power.
Specifically, corporate income taxes create an incentive for such “loan-rich, deposit-
poor” banks to securitize loans off their balance sheets. Their model also shows that, by
contrast, a bank that has limited lending opportunities and plentiful deposit capacities
does not respond to taxes. In addition, the authors document empirical evidence from
mortgage sales by small banks using variations in U.S. state level corporate tax rates.
Based on the theoretical framework in Han et al. (2014), we extend the analysis to
a multi-country setting by examining the tax incentives for the engagement of OECD
banks in ABS markets from 1999 to 2006. To identify different responses of funding
constrained and unconstrained banks to corporate income taxes, we construct a funding
constraint dummy based on banks’ loan to deposit ratios. A bank is defined as funding
constrained if it has a relatively high loan to deposit ratio. The rationale is that if a
bank has abundant loan origination opportunities to fund but is restricted by its limited
funding capacities in deposit markets, its funding costs will reflect a cost of deposits at
least equal to competitive interest rates. In addition, due to capital requirements, it
will have to fund a portion of its loans with an even higher corporate-tax adjusted cost
of equity. This weighted competitive cost of deposit funding plus tax-adjusted equity
funding can make on-balance sheet financing more expensive relative to securitization.
A pool of loans in a corporate-tax exempt securitization vehicle can be funded with
competitive financing but without a higher corporate tax-adjusted cost of equity. The
relative advantage of securitization grows when the corporate tax rate and equity capital
requirement of on-balance sheet funding are higher. Next, taking advantage of cross-
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country tax variations, we test whether funding constrained banks with headquarters in
jurisdictions of high tax rates are inclined to issue more ABS.
Our empirical findings suggest that corporate income taxation led to more securi-
tization at banks constrained at funding markets, while it did not affect securitization
at unconstrained banks, in line with the predictions of prior theories. A one standard
deviation rise in corporate income tax rates increases the securitization intensity by 1.4%.
Therefore, our findings of tax distorting effects are economically important especially
when we take into account the large volume of securitization. Our results continue to
hold in a battery of robustness checks, which include sample split, alternative dependent
variables, a restricted sample excluding U.S. banks, alternative measures of funding
constraints, using statutory tax rates and adopting weighted tax rates for multinational
banks.
Prior studies suggest that the likelihood and intensity of securitization are largely
determined by bank characteristics, such as funding needs (Carlstrom and Samolyk 1995;
Demsetz 2000; Loutskina and Strahan 2009; Loutskina 2011), risk exposure (Greenbaum
and Thakor 1987; Pavel and Phillis 1987; Panetta and Pozzolo 2010), capital adequacy
(Calomiris and Mason 2004; Ambrose et al. 2005; Bannier and Hänsel 2008) and profit
opportunities (Affinito and Tagliaferri 2010; Cardone-Riportella et al. 2010). Our
paper adds to the literature by providing empirical evidence of tax distorting effects
on banks’ incentive to securitize assets. This study also contributes to the research at
the intersection of taxation and banking that primarily focuses on distorting effects of
corporate income taxation on leverages, locations and legal structures of banks (Huizinga
2004), and pass-through of tax burdens (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 1999, 2001;
Albertazzi and Gambacorta 2010; Huizinga et al. 2014).
Unlike Han et al. (2014) using U.S. state level tax variations, we provide empirical
evidence of tax distorting effects on ABS issuance by exploiting tax variations across
OECD countries. Our cross-country setting has following advantages. First, there
are considerable variations in corporate income tax rates across different national ju-
risdictions4. Second, we show the generality of tax distorting effects in heterogenous
securitization markets that differ in market size, participation and regulation. However,
4Despite a general declining trend, corporate income tax rates remain substantially different across
countries. For instance, Ireland and Turkey have effective marginal CIT rates below 10%, whereas
Germany and Japan have rates above 35%.
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the cross country setting also challenges our identification. To control for country level
heterogeneity, we use a series of macroeconomic and regulatory variables. Besides, we
construct weighted tax rates based on operating income and profits of foreign subsidiaries
for banks operating in multiple jurisdictions. In the end, all results support our predic-
tions and are robust.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews a simplified
framework for our analysis and derives testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents data
sources. Section 2.4 sets out estimation strategies and summary statistics. Section 2.5
contains our empirical analysis and robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes the paper
and proposes policy implications.
2.2. Theoretical Framework
Based on the partial equilibrium models in Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi
(1995) and Han et al. (2014), we review a framework to illustrates the tax distorting
effects on securitization at banks and derive testable hypotheses.
A bank can invest in loans and money market securities. A loan yields a return rL
when the bank implements screening and monitoring services. At the same time, the
bank incurs the cost of providing such services, c. By contrast, investments in money
market securities pay an interest rate rd, equivalent to the cost of wholesale deposit
financing. In the end, profits of the bank from all investments are subject to a CIT rate
τ .
The bank can finance on-balance sheet through equity and deposits. First, the cost
of equity is re. Second, the bank may collect retail deposits in the local market at the
cost rD. Han et al. (2014) assume imperfect competition in the retail deposit market by
an increasing marginal cost of retail deposits, ∂rD
∂D
> 0. rD ≥ rd holds for a sufficiently
high level of deposits.
Assume two types of banks differ in funding constraints. Funding unconstrained
banks have market power in retail deposit markets but no advantage at loan origination.




r̄onBS = rd (2.1)
where r̄onBS is the marginal cost of on-balance sheet financing of the funding uncon-
strained banks and rd is the cost of wholesale deposits funding. Due to limited loan
origination opportunities, the unconstrained banks invest excessive deposits into money
market securities. By contrast, funding constrained banks lack deposit market power
but have lots of lending opportunities. Funding asset expansion primarily by equity
financing, the constrained banks issue retail deposits up to the point where the cost of
retail deposit and the tax-adjusted cost of equity are equalized at a point greater than




= rD > rd (2.2)
where r̃onBS is the marginal cost of on-balance sheet financing of the funding constrained
banks. Essentially, the constrained banks find funding loans profitable and invest no
money market securities.
Han et al. (2014) assume that a bank can securitize a part of its loans in exchange for
additional funding at the cost of roffBS = rd. This is because competitively priced ABS
and money market securities can be treated as substitutes when these financial products
share similar characteristics of liquidity and risk. Moreover, the cost of funding through
securitization is exempt from corporate income taxes because the SPV is structured as
an investment vehicle similar to a mutual fund5. When securitizing loans, the bank
may benefit from a fall in the cost of financing ronBS − roffBS , depending on the funding
constraint and the cost of on-balance sheet financing. In this way, securitization acts as
an off-balance sheet substitute for the conventional on-balance sheet financing.
However, a moral hazard problem arises, limiting the extent to which a bank securi-
tizes loans. Whenever some risk is transferred in securitization, the incentive for banks to
5In practice, tax neutrality is usually accomplished in a variety of ways. First, offshore SPVs are
widely used to maintain no taxable presence in originator’s jurisdiction. Set up in tax havens or tax-
friendly countries to OECD, such as Cayman Islands, Irish docks and Jersey, SPVs have access to tax
avoidance strategies unpermitted at home jurisdictions. Second, SPVs are structured as tax transparent
pass-through entities. For instance, treated as tax transparent and pass-through, real estate mortgage
investment conduits (REMICs) are generally not taxed in the U.S. Third, SPVs can be designed to have
little material income tax liability, i.e., its deductible expenses perfectly offset income, reducing taxable
income to zero.
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screen and monitor remains suboptimally low in spite of certain features in securitization
contracts targeted at remedying the moral hazard problem6. Rational investors of ABS
may expect declined screening and monitoring services and therefore discount the value
of the loans by a discount factor η. Hence, suffering a loss of the loan value, the bank
earns ηrL−F in securitization instead of rL− c when holding loans on the balance sheet
until maturity, where F is the fixed cost of securitization7.
Based on the trade-off between savings of funding costs ronBS − roffBS and losses in
loan values (1− η)rL + F − c, a securitization project is profitable only if the following
condition holds:
(ronBS − roffBS )− [(1− η)rL + F − c] > 0 (2.3)
Funding unconstrained banks cannot satisfy the condition (2.3) because their marginal
cost of on-balance sheet financing is already sufficiently low.
(r̄onBS − roffBS )− [(1− η)rL + F − c] = (rd − rd)− [(1− η)rL + F − c] < 0 (2.4)
Therefore the unconstrained banks merely incur losses in securitization without effec-
tively lowering costs of funding8. By contrast, funding constrained banks are likely to
benefit from lower funding costs from securitization.
(r̃onBS − roffBS )− [(1− η)rL + F − c] = (
re
1− τ
− rd)− [(1− η)rL + F − c] R 0 (2.5)
the first term in condition (2.5) is positive because re > rd(1−τ) always holds, reflecting a
tax advantage of debt financing to equity financing9. If the tax-adjusted cost of equity is
sufficiently large, or the loss of loan values and fixed costs of securitization are sufficiently
small, it is possible for the bank to make profits in securitizing loans. Here, corporate
6Certain contract features, such as offering implicit recourse, holding equity tranche and over-
collateralization, are designed to alleviate the moral hazard problem and to reduce the agency cost
of securitization. Consistent with theoretical predictions of reduced incentives to carefully screen and
monitor borrowers, some empirical studies find a decline in the credit quality in securitized loans (Keys
et al. 2010; Purnanandam 2011; Keys et al. 2012).
7Fixed costs usually include the costs associated with setting up SPVs, rating fees, auditing and legal
expenses.
8Gijle et al. (2013) find that banks experiencing deposits windfalls in U.S. shale-boom counties tend
to fund their mortgage lending through low cost deposits instead of securitization.
9In Han et al. (2015), when the differences in personal income taxation of debt and equity has been
taken into account, although the competitive state prices of equity and debt claims may differ, a net
tax advantage to debt financing remains. This analysis is orthogonal to our analysis of tax advantage
of securitization financing due to corporate income taxation.
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income taxation plays a role. Notably, banks in a jurisdiction of higher tax rates have
a higher tax-adjusted cost of equity and thus a higher cost of the on-balance sheet
financing. The likelihood of securitization rises in the difference between on-balance
sheet financing and securitization financing. Moreover, given that a bank is determined
to securitize assets, a higher tax rate that augments the marginal benefit of securitization
is expected to increase the volume of securitization.
This framework identifies a micro channel that connects corporate income taxation
and bank securitization, depending on bank funding constraints. We derive the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Funding constrained banks, namely, banks with plentiful loan origination
opportunities but limited deposit capacities, are more likely to securitize and securitize
more assets when subject to a higher corporate income tax rate..
Hypothesis 2: Funding unconstrained banks, namely, banks with little loan origination
opportunities and substantial deposit capacities, have no tax incentive to securitize assets.
2.3. Data
The data for this research are collected from a number of sources, including ABS
Alert, Bankscope, World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD), Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys and Databases.
We use the ABS Alert to identify banks that issued asset backed securities. The
ABS Alert is a comprehensive database that presents all rated asset-backed issues placed
anywhere in the world since 1985. We drop non-banks sponsors such as airlines, retailers,
hedge funds, auto manufacturers and so forth. In addition, we rely on the amount and
the pricing date of issuance to determine the intensity and the year of securitization,
respectively. For the sake of matching originators in the ABS Alert with banks in
Bankscope, we also collect relevant information about seller types, countries of denom-
ination and collateral, currencies and rating agencies. Our analysis of securitization
covers the booming period of securitization markets in 1999–2006 for two reasons. On
the one hand, some countries lacked legislation that simplifies and encourages the use of
securitization as a financing technique before the late 1990s. Therefore, the securitization
9
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markets were quite small outside the U.S. before the beginning of our sample period10.
On the other hand, we exclude the period of the subprime crisis in which securitization
transactions were likely to be market driven.
We obtain balance sheets and income statements for financial institutions from Bankscope.
Our bank sample consists of bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative
banks and savings banks with headquarters in 19 OECD countries. Even though finance
companies, investment banks, real estate and mortgage banks, specialized governmental
credit institution, such as Nissan, Lehman Brothers, Delta Funding and WestLB AG, are
important sponsors in ABS markets, we exclude them from our sample as their business
models differ substantially from our theoretical analysis. Specifically, these financial
institutions are not deposit-taking and loan-making banks. Next, we include banks only
if the average of their total assets over the sample period ranks in the upper quartile
in the distribution of bank size in each country. We restrict our sample to large banks
for two reasons. First, in practice ABS markets are dominated by large banks which
usually own the know-how of securitization techniques, good reputation and access to
securitization markets. Moreover, large banks are able to undertake the substantial fixed
costs in securitization transactions11. Second, securitization transactions of large banks
contribute to systemic risk and financial fragility. Therefore the ABS issuance of large
banks is policy relevant to regulators.
To link the securitization information to bank specific variables, we match originators
in the ABS Alert with banks in Bankscope, if they share the identical name and country
of residence. We double check the matching process by manually referring to Moody’s
rating reports for each ABS issuance if rated by Moody, which presents information
about all participants involved in the securitization transactions. Our final sample ends
up with 4423 banks with headquarters in 19 OECD countries in the 1999–2006 period,
in which 265 banks had at least one asset backed issue12. Our unit of analysis is the
10For instance, the Italian market of securitization had not started growing remarkably until the
enactment of Law 130 in 1999.
11In practice, small banks with no direct access to ABS markets might sell loans to large institutions
that pool and securitize them. This means in some cases the underlying assets of ABS are not originated
by the sponsor of ABS, which may bring noises and biases to our analysis. Fortunately, this usually
happens in the deals in which large investment banks act as sponsors and are excluded from our sample.
Therefore, most securitizing banks in our sample originate loans as the underlying assets and complete
off-balance sheet securitization themselves.
12Using bank names and countries of residence as a reference, Panetta and Pozzolo (2010) match




In our empirical analysis, we implicitly assume that SPVs are corporate tax advan-
taged relative to banks, because SPVs hold loans funded with debt and equity but are
corporate income tax exempt in contrast to banks which hold loans funded with debt and
equity and pay corporate income taxes13. This is a reasonable assumption as failures of
SPVs to be tax exempt would lead to double taxation at both originator and SPV levels,
therefore making securitization transactions unprofitable (Gorton and Souleles 2007)14.
In most specifications, we use effective marginal tax rates of CIT, based on statutory
tax rates from the OECD tax database. In one robustness check, we also use statutory
tax rates directly.
We use macroeconomic variables from World Development Indicators (WDI) to con-
trol for economic growth, inflation and financial development. Additionally, we col-
lect information regarding banking competition from the Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD). Moreover, we control for different regulatory and supervisory in-
stitutions across countries, based on two rounds of surveys conducted by World Bank
(2003 and 2007). The Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys and Databases cover
various aspects of banking and permit the identification of the existing regulation and
supervision of banks (Barth et al. 2001).
When calculating profit-weighted and income-weighted tax rates for multinational
banks in some robustness checks, we rely on the Bankscope to determine the relationship
between domestic parent companies and foreign subsidiaries. Foreign subsidiaries are
defined as subsidiaries that are located in another country and are owned by an ultimate
home parent company or not ultimately owned but owned at least 51% by the home
parent company. Besides, we restrict foreign subsidiaries as those operating in our sample
OECD countries. Overall, successfully matched with the parent banks in the Bankscope,
189 banks in our sample are classified as multinational banks having foreign subsidiaries.
Last, Appendix Table A.1 provides detailed information for variable definitions and data
for bank securitization. They end up with a sample of 696 matched pairs. It is worth noting that
their research covers a longer period (1991–2007), more countries (140 countries) and various types of
securitization (asset-backed securities (ABSs), mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)), therefore they have more matched
securitizing banks.
13We thank the referee for clarifying this point.
14Due to data limitation, we have little traceable information of SPVs in most securitization
transactions. However, this argument is in line with anecdotal facts that SPVs do have an advantage
as long as they are, indeed, truly bankruptcy remote and off balance sheet.
11
Chapter 2: Does Corporate Income Taxation Affect Securitization?
sources.
2.4. Estimation
To assess a bank’s incentive in securitization, we examine the impact of tax rates and
funding constraints on securitization, controlling for bank level variables, and country
level macroeconomic and regulatory variables. Assuming each bank in our sample
makes funding decisions individually based on the trade-off between costs and benefits
of securitization, we observe zero securitization in the dependent variables when some
banks find securitization unprofitable. In this sense, our sample is left-censored at zero.
Therefore, we employ Tobit regressions as follows
SARi,j,t =α1CIT j,t + α2CIT j,t × Constrainedi,j,(t−1) + α3Constrainedi,j,(t−1)







where i, j, t denotes the bank, the country and the year, respectively. The dependent
variable, securitization asset ratio SARi,j,t, is defined as a ratio of the total amount of
securitization to bank total assets for bank i in country j in year t (SAR = ABS
TA
, where
ABS stands for the total amount of ABS issuance and TA represents bank total assets).
Specifically, the total amount of securitization is calculated by aggregating the amount
of each ABS issuance for bank i in country j in year t. Moreover, a bank with its
headquarter in jurisdiction j is subject to the corporate income tax rate CIT j,t in year
t. In addition, Constrainedi,j,(t−1) is a funding constraint dummy that takes the value
one if bank i is classified as funding constrained in year t− 1, and zero otherwise.
Our estimation rests on the definition of the funding constraint. In the previous
model, a bank is classified as funding constrained if it has rich loans and poor deposits,
and unconstrained otherwise. In practice, the loan to deposit ratio is frequently used
to measure the relative abundance of investment opportunities to deposit capacities.
Ideally, a bank having a high loan to deposit ratio is funding constrained and should
look for extra liquidity. Hence, we define the funding constraint dummy based on the
loan to deposit ratio in most specifications. In particular, the funding constraint dummy
DLoanToDeposit takes the value one if a bank ranks in the upper quartile of the distribution
12
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of the loan to deposit ratios in each country, and zero otherwise.
To identify the tax effects on funding constrained and unconstrained banks, we
interact the funding constraint dummy with tax rates, allowing tax incentives to vary
depending on funding constraints. In particular, the sum of the coefficients α1 and α2
shows the tax effect on banks with substantial loan expansion opportunities but limited
deposit resources, while α2 by itself measures the sensitivity of funding unconstrained
banks to corporate income taxes. If the sum of α1 and α2 is positive and significant,
we could interpret it as evidence for the tax incentive at funding constrained banks to
securitize. By contrast, funding unconstrained banks do not respond to tax rates when
making securitization decisions according to the theoretical predictions. Hence, α2 is
expected to be insignificant.
As noted above, we have a vector of bank specific regressors, Wi,j,(t−1), including
proxies of leverages, risks and performances15. First, Equity/TA represents a ratio of
bank equity to total assets, measuring the leverage and capital adequacy of banks16.
Calomiris and Mason (2004), Ambrose et al. (2005) and Pavel and Philis (1987) provide
evidence that less capitalized banks try to reduce regulatory capital requirements through
securitization. However, it is also likely that more solvent banks tend to securitize (Ban-
nier and Hänsel 2008). Hence, the effect of bank capital on securitization is ambiguous.
Next, we include Z Score, which is the sum of capital asset ratio and ROA divided by
the standard deviation of ROA, to measure the credit risk of the bank. In particular,
we use three-year rolling windows and take log transformation as in Laeven and Levine
(2009). The sign of the relationship between credit risk and securitization is also far from
15We do not include the bank size into regressions since we have already considered the crucial effect
of bank size on securitization and restricted our sample to large banks only.
16It is less likely that leverage leads to endogeneity bias in our analysis. First, in the model of
Han et al. (2014) in the absence of securitization market, bank leverages are determined by loan and
deposit market conditions as well as corporate tax rates. In the securitization decision, it is the trade-
off of marginal costs of on and off-balance sheet financing, rather than bank leverage, that determines
whether to securitize or not. Therefore, once we include tax rates, the funding constraint dummy, and
the interaction of the two, it is unlikely our results are contaminated by omitted variable bias. We also
control for other bank level variables, regulatory variables and macroeconomic variables to mitigate the
concern of omitted variable bias. Second, securitization may affect bank leverage ex post as loans are
removed from balance sheets and bank excess capital decreases. By contrast, in the model of Han et al.
(2014) there is no channel through which leverages directly affect securitization. Therefore, we are less
worried about reverse causality. In addition, we explicitly include bank leverages (Equity/TA) in our
specifications to control for other possible channels through which leverages may directly or indirectly
affect securitization, for instance regulatory capital arbitrage. Third, the average standard deviation
of equity over total assets for each bank in our sample period is 1.09, indicating time-varying leverage.
Therefore, the assumption of persistent leverage does not hold and hence endogeneity bias is less of
concern. We are grateful to the referee for raising this point.
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unanimous. Though Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) show that banks should securitize
low risk assets, Panetta and Pozzolo (2010) find that risky banks transfer credit risk
through securitization. Last, ROA is return on assets, which measures the operational
performance of a bank. We expect efficient banks to be able to undertake securitization.
All bank specific explanatory variables, including the funding constraint dummy, are
lagged by one period to avoid a potential problem of endogeneity. To prevent extreme
values from biasing our empirical results, we winsorize the bank specific variables at the
1% and 99% levels.
We also include a set of macroeconomic control variables, Zj,t. We consider GDP per
capita 2005, GDP per capita Growth and Inflation to capture the level of economic
development, income growth and inflation, respectively. In particular, high growth
rates of GDP per capita are expected to boost credit expansions, which further fuel
securitization. Next, we include Traded Stock/GDP, which measures the volume of stock
traded as a percentage of GDP, indicating the level of financial development. We expect
banks in highly developed financial systems to securitize more assets. Moreover, we
control for the competition in the banking sector, Bank Concentration. As securitization
transactions are mostly dominated by large banks, we expect that large banks in highly
concentrated markets tend to securitize more assets.
As our sample includes banks operating in heterogeneous banking systems, we need
to control for regulatory and supervisory differences, Xj,t. In particular, we do not use
country fixed effects which eliminate the bulk of variations in corporate income tax rates
across countries. Instead, we use explicit indicators of bank regulation and supervision.
First, we include a dummy indicating risk related capital requirements. Risk Related
Capital Ratio takes the value one if the country adopts the minimum capital ratio that
varies as a function of an individual bank’s credit risk, and zero otherwise. Second, we
include a variable of official supervisory actions, Multiple Supervisory Bodies, indicating
single or multiple supervisory authorities for banks. Next, we include an indicator of
private monitoring. Disclosure Risk Management implies whether it is compulsory for
banks to disclose risk management procedure to the public. Depositors could monitor
banks better if risk management procedures are publicly known and accessible. Similarly,
deposit insurance may affect banks’ risk taking and securitization, hence we include
a dummy Explicit Deposit Insurance that distinguishes between explicit and implicit
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deposit insurance systems. Last, we include Restrictions on Real Estate that depict
the degree of regulatory restrictiveness for banks engaging in real estate investment,
development and management. Such restrictions may directly affect banks’ involvement
in mortgage and off-balance sheet activities.
Our regressions include year dummies Tts that capture common macroeconomic
shocks to all banks within the same year, for instance business cycles. εijt is an error
term. Finally, in all specifications, we cluster heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
at the bank level, and our results continue to hold when clustering standard errors at
the country level.
Table 2.1 tabulates the distributions of banks, securitizing banks and ABS issuance
across countries17. It is worth noting that U.S. banks account for two thirds of our
bank sample. Additionally, the ABS market in U.S. has been the largest in the world.
Moreover, Table 2.1 displays geographic variations in SARs and effective tax rates as
well. In particular, Australian, Dutch and Spanish banks present pretty high SARs.
Presenting the time distribution of banks, securitizing banks and ABS issuance, Table
2.2 suggests that securitization markets have been growing and more banks have been
involving in asset securitization over time. In addition, Table 2.2 plots the evolution
of SARs and tax rates. Finally, Table 2.3 displays summary statistics of all variables.
Notably, the securitization asset ratio has a mean of 0.26% in our sample18. In addition,
effective marginal tax rates are generally smaller than statutory tax rates.
2.5. Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results of regressions. First, we look at the tax effects on
funding constrained and unconstrained banks in the benchmark regressions, controlling
for bank specific variables, macroeconomic and regulatory variables. Next, we conduct
a number of robustness checks by splitting our sample into funding constrained and
unconstrained banks, adopting alternative dependent variables adjusted for off-balance
sheet items, using a restricted sample of non-U.S. banks, using alternative measures
17Securitizing banks are defined as banks that issues asset-backed securities.
18The small sample means of SAR and SARadj are primarily driven by the large group of
nonsecuritizing banks (4158 banks or 94% of our sample). The means of SAR and SARadj are 7.7%
and 5.9% for the group of securitizing banks, which are reasonable.
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of funding constraints, using statutory tax rates, and adopting weighted tax rates for
multinational banks.
2.5.1. Baseline Results
Table 2.4 presents the main results of this study. We report the estimated marginal
effects at variable means rather than regression coefficients which are not straightforward
to interpret. The first column presents the results for the benchmark regression. In
accordance with Hypothesis 2, we have an insignificant coefficient α1 for the variable
of tax rates, indicating no tax effect at funding unconstrained banks. By contrast,
the estimated coefficient α2 for the interaction between corporate income tax rates and
the funding constraint dummy is positive and statistically significant. Furthermore,
the sum of α1 and α2 is positive and highly significant, consistent with the prediction
in Hypothesis 1 that higher corporate income taxes create an incentive for funding
constrained banks to securitize assets. Specifically, the sum of the marginal effects
of α1 and α2 is 0.09, indicating that a one percentage point rise in corporate income
tax rates raises the securitization asset ratio by 0.09%. Put differently, relative to
the average securitization asset ratio of 0.26% in our sample, a one standard deviation
rise of tax rates (4.02 percentage points) increases the securitization intensity by 1.4%
(= 4.02× 0.09÷ 0.26), which is economically significant.
Among bank specific variables, we find that the estimated marginal effect for the
bank leverage is negative and significant. This finding supports the regulatory capital
arbitrage story that less capitalized banks tend to securitize more assets to set free
capital. Moreover, we find that risky banks of a low Z score securitize more assets,
possibly for the sake of transferring credit risk. Finally, we find that banks with a higher
ROA securitize more assets, reflecting that efficient banks are capable of securitizing
assets. As for macroeconomic control variables, the regression output indicates that
banks headquartered in countries of a lower level of economic development but higher
economic growth and more advanced financial markets, tend to securitize more assets.
With regard to regulatory and supervisory institutions, we find that risk related capital
requirements promote securitization, whereas multiple supervision bodies and explicit




To relax the restrictions of identical coefficients of bank specific variables, macroeconomic
variables and regulatory variables for funding constrained and unconstrained banks in
the benchmark regression, we divide our sample into two corresponding subsamples. We
present the output of the separate Tobit regressions in columns 2 and 3. In line with our
predictions, we identify tax effects for the funding constrained banks only. In addition,
reported in the last row, our results reject the null hypothesis that tax effect is no greater
in the constrained subsample than that in the unconstrained subsample. We conclude
that corporate income taxes have greater impacts on the “loan-rich, deposit-poor” banks
than on the “loan-poor, deposit-rich” banks. For brevity, we report variables of interest
only and do not report the marginal effects on bank level, macroeconomic level and
regulatory variables for subsequent tables.
One possible caveat to our previous specifications is that the denominator of the
dependent variable, bank total assets, does not include off-balance sheet items. To
show our analysis are not biased by the construction of the dependent variable, we
define an adjusted securitization asset ratio SARadj =
ABS
TA+ABS
, assuming that the ABS
outstanding issuance largely captures the scale of off-balance sheet items19. Therefore,
the adjusted securitization asset ratio can control for both on-and off-balance sheet
items. As reported the results in column 4 of Table 2.4, the results continue to support
our predictions.
A concern with our sample is that U.S. banks account for more than two thirds,
although our sample contains banks with headquarters in 19 OECD countries. Addi-
tionally, U.S. has the largest ABS market, accounting for roughly 70% of global issuance.
To rule out the scenario that our results are driven by a single country, we exclude U.S.
banks for fear of its over-representation. Consequently, our results continue to hold in
the non-U.S. sample as in column 1 in Table 2.5 we document a significant tax distorting
effect at the funding constrained banks and nil tax effect at the unconstrained banks.
In the previous specifications, we define the funding constraint dummy relying on the
loan to deposit ratios. Alternatively, we construct a new measure of funding constraint
dummy based on growth rates of loans and market shares of deposits. In particular,
we generate a dummy DLoanGrowth that indicates whether a bank ranks in the upper
19We thank the referee for suggesting this alternative dependent variable.
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quartile in the distribution of loan growth rates in a given country. Similarly, we generate
a dummy DDepositShare that indicates whether a bank ranks in the lower quartile in
the distribution of deposit market shares in a given country. Next, the alternative
funding constraint dummy DLoanGrowth×DDepositShare is a product of these two dummies
and takes the value one if a bank has a relatively high growth rate of loans and a
relatively small market share of customer deposits. In column 2 we present the regression
output, adopting DLoanGrowth×DDepositShare as the funding constraint dummy. Again, the
marginal effect of tax rates is insignificant whereas the sum of the marginal effects of
the tax rates and the interaction term remains positive and highly significant, consistent
with our hypotheses.
Instead of using deposit market shares, we again rely on deposit interest rates and
loan growth rates to define funding constraints in column 3. Though absolute prices
are not good proxies for competition, deposit interest rates directly measure the cost
of deposit financing. We expect banks paying higher deposit rates to have stronger
incentives to securitize. We calculate the deposit interest rates by dividing deposit
interest expenses over total deposits and generate a dummy DDepositInterest that indicates
whether a bank ranks in the upper quartile in the distribution of deposit rates in a given
country. Likewise, the alternative funding constraint dummy DLoanGrowth×DDepositInterest
is a product of DLoanGrowth and DDepositInterest and takes the value one if a bank has a
relatively high growth rate of loans and pays relatively high deposit interest rates. We
find qualitative similar results that support our predictions.
All the results presented so far are based on effective marginal tax rates of corporate
income taxes. In column 1 of Table 2.6, we use statutory tax rates instead. Consequently,
we have largely unchanged results. In particular, the marginal effect of tax rates is
insignificant while the marginal effect of the interaction term is positive and significant.
Overall, the sum of the two marginal effects is positive and significant, indicating funding
constrained banks securitize more assets when faced with higher corporate income tax
rates.
As our sample includes a number of large, multinational banks whose revenues from
different foreign subsidiaries are likely to be subject to different corporate income tax
schemes, we address this issue by constructing income-weighted tax rates for multina-
tional banks. The idea is to use the share of the operating income from each foreign
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subsidiary as weights to calculate a weighted tax rate that applies to the parent company.
As a result, the weighted tax rate is bank-specific, depending on both the geographic
and income distribution of foreign subsidiaries. For simplicity, we ignore practical issues
such as tax credit and tax treaties between home and host countries. The formula for














where WCITOperatingIncomep,t is an income-weighted tax rate for parent company p in year
t. The weight is determined by the income share of foreign subsidiaries f as well as home
subsidiaries h. We define OperatingIncome as a sum of net interest revenues and other
operating income. Additionally, CITf,t and CITh,t denote corporate income tax rates
in foreign countries and home country, respectively. In the end, we adopt the income-
weighted tax rates for multinational banks and retain the original tax rates for banks
operating within a single country. Due to the problem of missing values of operating
income, we have the operating income-weighted tax rates for 60 multinational banks
only. The weighted tax rates are largely close to the original tax rates. We present the
output of the regression using operating income-weighted tax rates in column 2. The
results continue to support our hypotheses. As a robustness check, we also calculate
operating profit-weighted tax rates, WCITOperatingProfit, using the same approach. The
distorting effects of corporate income taxes documented in the last column are significant
and comparable to that using operating income-weighted tax rates.
2.6. Concluding Remarks
“The evidence strongly suggests that without the excess demand from securitizers,
subprime mortgage origination (undeniably the original source of crisis) would have
been far smaller and defaults accordingly far fewer” (Alan Greenspan’s testimony to
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2008). Therefore, a clear
understanding of the motives behind banks’ surging supply of asset securitization is
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crucial. The current debate on securitization has resulted in fruitful discussions about
how to improve bank regulation. For instance, BIS (2011) proposed new measures,
such as revised capital requirements and liquidity coverage ratios, to improve bank
supervision. However, insufficient attention has been paid to tax systems. Besides,
the debate on the role of taxation in the crisis has been restricted to excess leverages and
distorted investments towards home ownership by certain income tax rules that fueled
the housing bubbles (Keen 2011; Shaviro 2011).
Along with Han et al. (2014), we document the tax distorting effects on securitization
in a sample of OECD banks over the period from 1999 to 2006. Consistent with the
theoretical predictions, we find that banks with substantial loan origination capacities
but little deposit market power are more likely to securitize and securitize more assets in
a higher tax regime. This tax distorting effect is economically and statistically significant
in all specifications. By contrast, corporate income taxation does not affect securitization
at funding unconstrained banks. Our results are robust to various sensitivity tests.
Our analysis have direct policy implications. Given the tax arbitrage has already
contributed to excessive growth of securitization, we may need to address the tax dis-
tortions in current corporate income tax systems. One possible solution would be to
introduce an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) system that allows a deduction for
returns on equity as well (Keen 2011). The ACE systems have been applied in Belgium
and are expected to get rid of tax penalty on capital reserves as well as asymmetric
tax treatment between on-and off-balance sheet financing. This neutralized tax treat-
ment might not only contain excess leverage, but also alleviate the tax disadvantage
of on-balance sheet financing for funding constrained banks and therefore prevent their
excessive securitization and risk taking. In addition, the proposal of levying new taxes
on banks may intensify distortions and therefore seems inappropriate. In 2009, Liberal
Democrats proposed an extra tax of 10 percent on bank profits, in order to pay off
UK’s public deficit. Moreover, the Financial Activities Tax (FAT) levied on the sum of
bank profits were laid out in the International Monetary Fund interim report in 2010
in response to the subprime financial crisis. Although FAT was expected to discourage
undesirable risk taking and to raise additional revenues to pay for bailouts (IMF 2010),
in our point of view the new taxes on banks could further distort banks’ incentive to
engage in securitization and generate adverse effects on banks and securitization markets.
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In particular, in order to lower financing cost and to satisfy funding demand, banks are
inclined to securitize more assets than the optimal amount, contributing to excessive
securitization that threatens the safety and soundness of banking.
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Table 2.1: Country distributions
Country No. of banks No. of securitizing banks ABS (bn USD) SAR ECIT
Australia 6 6 37.712 1.838 27.061
Austria 64 1 0.650 0.001 26.881
Belgium 18 4 15.869 0.380 26.627
Canada 21 7 16.578 0.137 29.751
France 83 11 97.430 0.071 26.617
Germany 543 10 158.359 0.010 33.817
Ireland 6 4 12.594 0.415 9.362
Italy 187 42 80.715 0.429 31.359
Japan 196 15 26.340 0.022 37.094
Mexico 13 2 1.350 0.050 20.575
Netherlands 14 8 128.914 1.439 27.897
Portugal 11 5 19.072 0.649 23.669
South Korea 4 2 1.497 0.066 18.873
Spain 54 32 195.696 1.353 30.663
Sweden 26 1 0.179 0.002 20.298
Switzerland 107 2 326.589 0.056 16.857
Turkey 12 6 8.646 0.430 11.021
UK 44 15 538.166 0.341 24.641
US 3014 92 2679.768 0.311 32.989
Sum 4423 265 4346.122 0.264 25.044
Table 2.2: Time distributions
Year No. of banks No. of securitizing banks ABS (bn USD) SAR ECIT
1999 1608 75 127.126 0.511 26.742
2000 2119 97 190.564 0.305 26.225
2001 3569 117 291.033 0.210 25.636
2002 3700 113 376.681 0.184 25.635
2003 3692 116 554.439 0.263 24.880
2004 3692 107 634.964 0.207 24.570
2005 3631 121 939.178 0.272 23.827
2006 3230 128 1232.138 0.323 22.753
22
Concluding Remarks
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 1% Median 99%
SAR 25232 0.26 3.24 0.00 0.00 5.78
SARadj 25232 0.20 1.98 0.00 0.00 5.47
ECIT 25232 32.02 4.02 15.39 32.99 40.89
SCIT 25228 38.67 4.18 24.10 39.30 52.03
WCITOperatingIncome 25232 32.20 4.02 15.39 32.99 40.89
WCITOperatingProfit 25232 32.20 4.03 15.39 32.99 40.89
Loan to Deposit Ratio 25232 97.98 61.18 16.70 89.10 353.36
Deposit Interest Rate 24722 3.01 6.10 0.13 2.80 7.11
Loan Growth 24517 13.58 35.55 -28.77 8.31 128.60
Deposit Market Share 25232 0.45 2.30 0.00 0.01 12.18
Bank Size 25232 18.17 90.27 0.26 1.23 437.51
Z Score 25232 4.36 1.17 1.29 4.37 7.09
Equity/TA 25232 8.52 5.06 2.57 8.05 24.12
ROA 25232 0.94 1.10 -0.95 0.91 3.88
GDP per capita 2005 25232 10.57 0.19 10.04 10.63 10.83
GDP per capita Growth 25232 1.68 1.18 -0.49 1.81 3.99
Inflation 25232 2.31 1.74 -0.80 2.27 3.52
Traded Stock/GDP 25232 159.55 82.15 5.50 157.65 309.65
Bank concentration 25232 39.92 21.40 21.40 29.82 91.91
Risk Related Capital Ratio 25232 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
Multiple Supervisory Bodies 25232 0.74 0.44 0 1 1
Disclosure Risk Management 25232 0.31 0.46 0 0 1
Explicit Deposit Insurance 25232 1.00 0.04 1 1 1
Restrictions on Real Estate 25232 3.28 1.27 1 4 4
Notes: Bank Size is expressed in billion USD. GDP per capita 2005 is the log of GDP per capita in
2005 USD. Risk Related Capital Ratio, Disclosure Risk Management, Disclosure Risk Management,
and Explicit Deposit Insurance are dummy variables. Restrictions on Real Estate is a scale variable
from 1 to 4, with larger numbers indicating greater restrictiveness. The rest variables are expressed
as a percentage.
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Table 2.4: Baseline Regressions
The dependent variables are securitization asset ratios (SAR) in columns 1 to 3, and adjusted
securitization asset ratio (SAR adj) in column 4. Columns 1 and 4 show the results for our full sample.
Columns 2 and 3 show the results for the subsample of funding constrained banks only and funding
unconstrained banks only, respectively. In addition, we report the test results of whether the sum of α1
and α2 is positive and significant for the full sample. In the end, we report the test results of whether α1
of the constrained subsample is greater than α1 of the unconstrained subsample. Overall, we report the
estimated marginal effects at variable means. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank
level and reported in parentheses below the marginal effects. Marginal effects of year dummies are not
reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAR SAR SAR SAR adj
ECIT 0.021 0.138*** 0.013 0.015
(0.026) (0.049) (0.021) (0.017)




Equity/TA -0.134*** -0.253*** -0.062** -0.089***
(0.035) (0.080) (0.026) (0.021)
Z Score -0.383*** -0.557*** -0.283*** -0.250***
(0.087) (0.169) (0.092) (0.051)
ROA 0.849*** 1.610*** 0.412** 0.566***
(0.190) (0.375) (0.207) (0.114)
GDP per capita 2005 -0.988*** -2.950*** -0.446 -0.684***
(0.353) (0.843) (0.294) (0.229)
GDP per capita Growth 0.190*** 0.341*** 0.114** 0.125***
(0.059) (0.131) (0.053) (0.037)
Inflation 0.012 -0.001 0.008 0.008
(0.024) (0.058) (0.021) (0.016)
Traded Stock/GDP 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Bank concentration 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004)
Risk Related Capital Ratio 0.493*** 0.416 0.408** 0.325***
(0.185) (0.383) (0.176) (0.116)
Multiple Supervisory Bodies -3.076*** -3.902*** -2.445*** -2.067***
(0.582) (0.966) (0.688) (0.333)
Disclosure Risk Management -0.357 -0.438 -0.307 -0.238
(0.262) (0.597) (0.225) (0.172)
Explicit Deposit Insurance -3.339*** -3.769* -2.844** -2.278***
(1.174) (1.972) (1.223) (0.801)
Restrictions on Real Estate 0.015 -0.006 0.010 0.011
(0.091) (0.176) (0.082) (0.060)
P-value of H1: α1 + α2 > 0 0.000 0.000
P-value of H1: α1 in the constrained subsample >
α1 in the unconstrained subsample
0.000
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Std. Err. clustered at Banks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.09
Observations 25,232 6,329 18,903 25,232
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Table 2.5: Robustness Checks
The dependent variables are securitization asset ratios (SAR). Column 1 shows results for the regression
of the non-U.S. sample. Column 2 shows results for the regression using the funding constraint dummy
based on deposit shares and loan growth. Column 3 shows results for regression using the funding
constraint dummy based on deposit interest rates and loan growth. In the end, we report the test
results of whether the sum of α1 and α2 is positive and significant for the full sample. Overall, we
report the estimated marginal effects at variable means. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the bank level and reported in parentheses below the marginal effects. Marginal effects of bank level,
macroeconomic and regulatory variables, and year dummies are not reported.
(1) (2) (3)
SAR SAR SAR














P-value of H1: α1 + α2 > 0 0.009 0.004 0.000
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic and Regulatory controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Std. Err. clustered at Banks Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.09 0.07
Observations 8,836 24,227 24,451
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Alternate tax rates
The dependent variables are securitization asset ratios (SAR). Column 1 shows results for the regression
using statutory tax rates. Column 2 and 3 show results of the regression using operating income-weighted
tax rates and operating profit-weighted tax rates, respectively. In the end, we test of whether the sum
of α1 and α2 is positive and significant for the full sample. Overall, we report the estimated marginal
effects at variable means. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level and reported in
parentheses below the marginal effects. Marginal effects of bank level, macroeconomic and regulatory















DLoanToDeposit -1.197 -0.712 -0.502
(0.839) (0.667) (0.684)
P-value of H1: α1 + α2 > 0 0.025 0.001 0.003
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic and Regulatory controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Std. Err. clustered at Banks Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0.09
Observations 25,228 25,232 25,232
***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%




Table A.1: Data Descriptions and Sources
Variables Descriptions Sources
SAR Securitization asset ratio, defined as a ratio
of the total amount of ABS issuance to bank




SARadj Adjusted securitization asset ratio, defined as
ABS
TA+ABS , where ABS stands for the total




ECIT Effective marginal tax rates of corporate
income taxes which measure the percentage









WCITOperatingIncome Corporate income taxes weighted by
operating income. The weight is determined





WCITOperatingProfit Corporate income taxes weighted by
operating profits. The weight is determined





DLoanToDeposit The funding constraint dummy that takes
the value one if a bank is in the upper
quartile of the distribution of the loan to
deposit ratios in each country, and zero
otherwise. Lagged by one period.
Bankscope
DLoanGrowth×DDepositShare The funding constraint dummy that takes the
value one if a bank is in the upper quartile of
the distribution of the loan growth rates and
in the lower quartile of the distribution of the
deposit market shares in each country, and
zero otherwise. Lagged by one period.
Bankscope
DLoanGrowth×DDepositInterest The funding constraint dummy that takes the
value one if a bank is in the upper quartile of
the distribution of the loan growth rates and
deposit interest rates in each country, and
zero otherwise. Lagged by one period.
Bankscope
Equity/TA Ratio of bank equity to total assets. Lagged
by one period.
Bankscope
Z Score Index of bank solvency risk which is
constructed as ROA+CARSD(ROA) and calculated
using three-year rolling windows, where ROA
stands for return on assets, CAR represents
capital asset ratio and SD(ROA) refers to
the standard deviation of ROA.
Bankscope
ROA Return on assets. Lagged by one period. Bankscope
GDP per capita 2005 GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD). WDI
GDP per capita Growth Annual growth rates of real GDP per capita. WDI
Inflation Annual growth rates of the GDP implicit
deflator.
WDI
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Bank Concentration Market concentration in the banking sector
in a given country.
GFDD
Risk Related Capital Ratio Dummy variable indicating that minimum
capita ratio varies as a function of an





Multiple Supervisory Bodies Dummy variable indicating multiple





Disclosure Risk Management Dummy variable indicating that it is
compulsory for banks to disclose risk











Restrictions on Real Estate Degree of regulatory restrictiveness for banks
engaging in real estate investment,
development and management on a scale









Activity: The Credit Composition
Channel
3.1. Introduction
Securitization is an important feature of modern financial systems. Starting in the
early 60s, securitization of mortgage loans became first common in the U.S. Securiti-
zation steadily became more widespread until the 2000s, when it reached around 50%
of outstanding mortgage and consumer loans in the U.S. The years prior to the crisis
of 2007-2009 were then characterized by a boom in worldwide securitization markets.
Between 2000 and 2006, issuance of securitization products more than tripled, from less
than $700 billion to about $2.800 billion20. The crisis then caused an effective breakdown
of securitization markets. Securitization activities retreated to levels only seen before
the 2000s and have stabilized at a low level since then.
Amid the carnage, a discussion has emerged about the future of securitization.
Several policy-makers have spoken out against, but also in favor of securitization markets.
Recently, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England (2013) have issued a
paper stating their intention to revive securitization markets, focusing on the high quality
segment of the ABS market.
Clearly, there are economic benefits and costs to securitization. First and foremost,
securitization allows banks to shift risk off their balance sheet and frees up capital for
new lending. Securitization is also an important risk management tool, allowing banks
to achieve a more diversified pool of exposures. This should lower their cost of taking on
risks, the benefit of which should, at least partially, be passed on to borrowers in the form
20Sources: the Flow of Funds database and the AB Alert and CM Alert databases.
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of more favorable lending conditions and higher credit availability. Securitization also
allows banks to better insulate themselves from funding shocks, potentially stabilizing
credit extension.
On the downside, securitization has demonstrated the potential to worsen the ef-
ficiency of financial intermediation. The main reason is the presence of informational
problems. In particular, banks, which tend to securitize, become less exposed to borrower
risk, which undermines their incentives to screen and monitor. This may result in lower
quality lending, and erodes the benefits of intermediation – relative to market-financing.
High complexity has also been identified as a potential cost to securitization, as it reduces
the ease with which outsiders can evaluate securitization products, potentially resulting
in inefficient investment decisions.
There is significant body of evidence supporting the idea that securitization affects
intermediation. The literature has typically focused on the impact of securitization on
banks themselves (such as their lending behavior or their risk-taking), the impact on
loan conditions (e.g., the pricing of loans) and the impact on borrowers (such as their
likelihood of default). This focus on the micro-level has clear advantages in providing
good settings for identification.
In this paper we consider the relationship between securitization and aggregate out-
comes, in particular economic activity. While identification is more challenging at
the aggregate level, this focus offers distinct advantages. Securitization is likely to
be associated with important externalities that cannot be captured by micro-studies.
For example, while securitization may very well increase profits and lower risk for the
bank that is shedding the risk, it may be detrimental to the buyers of securitization
products. In addition, securitization may also affect the efficiency of capital allocation
in the economy (it can either increase or decrease it), which has implications that will
not be visible at the immediate bank-firm nexus.
Specifically, in this paper we exploit country-level variations in securitization ac-
tivities to analyze the relationship between securitization and economic aggregates.
Based on a large international sample of securitization issuances from 1995 to 2012,
we find securitization activities to be negatively correlated with proxies for economic
activity, such as GDP per capita growth, capital formation and changes in new firm
establishments. The effect is economically significant and is not driven by the period of
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the Global Financial Crisis, suggesting that it is a structural property of securitization.
What can explain this finding? Our results indicate that the effect is neither driven by
the amount nor the quality of credit in the economy, which rules out most of the common
channels for why securitization affects macroeconomic outcomes. We put forward a new
channel, based on the idea that securitization affects the aggregate composition of credit
in the economy. Securitization of residential mortgage and consumer loans (which are
more homogenous and less information sensitive) is easier than for business loans. The
development of securitization is thus expected to broadly favor loans to households,
as opposed to loans to business. As both types of borrowers are competing for an
economy’s scarce resources, this may result in an aggregate reduction in investment and
lower economic activity21.
The data is broadly consistent with the credit composition channel. We show that
only securitization of loans to households is negatively related to economic activity.
Securitization of business loans instead displays as a positive association with economic
activity, albeit a weak one. In addition, we find that securitization increases an econ-
omy’s consumption-investment ratio. Furthermore, securitization has a more pronounced
(negative) impact on proxies of the supply side of the economy than on economic growth.
This is consistent with a shift from investment to consumption constraining the supply
side of the economy, while potentially boosting demand (and hence leading to a more
muted impact on GDP).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses
various channels that have been emphasized in the literature and through which securi-
tization may affect economic activity. We relate them to the credit composition channel
and form hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and the empirical methodology.
Section 3.4 contains the empirical results. The final section concludes and discusses
implications for policy.
21Consistent with the different implication for economic activity, Beck et al. (2012) show that, for
a sample of developed and developing economies, enterprise credit facilitates economic growth whereas
household credit has no impact on growth. Sassi and Gasmi (2014) , studying 27 European countries,
find that enterprise credit is positively related to economic growth whereas household credit has a
negative effect.
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3.2. Securitization and Economic Activity: Channels and Hypotheses
To evaluate the relationship between securitization and economic activity on macro level,
one should first understand the dynamics of securitization at micro level: Why are banks
and other financial institutions (and also some non-financial institutions) securitizing?
In an early contribution, Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) theoretically show that in a
frictionless environment (with full information and no regulation) securitization funding
and deposit funding are identical, but they also show how public policy, regulation and
information asymmetry change this. The literature proposes regulatory capital arbitrage,
gaining extra liquidity, better bank performance and more efficient risk sharing (risk
transfer) as driving factors behind securitization (see Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)
for a summary of the empirical literature). The empirical findings, however, are rather
mixed. On one hand, Panetta and Pozzolo (2010), for instance, find that the results of
securitization are ex-post in line with the expectations (securitizing banks increased their
capital ratios and reduced their riskiness) in a cross-country bank level analysis. Again,
using individual bank data Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010) find that banks once they
securitize have higher profits and lower bad loans. On the other hand, in their study with
U.S. bank data and propensity score matching technique, Casu et al. (2013) conclude
that first-time securitizing banks would have comparable costs of funding, credit risk
and profitability if they would not securitize. A crucial point is the complexity of these
financial instruments. Creating a high fixed cost to originate securities, this complexity
is a barrier to enter the securitization market (Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010), but there
are no effective barriers to buy these highly sophisticated securities and participate the
market as a buyer rather than originator.
The literature on dynamics of securitization almost exclusively focuses on bank
level securitization22. Many papers touch upon the factors explaining country level
securitization. The importance of legal framework regarding securitization is raised both
in Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) and Altunbas et al. (2009). Altunbas et al. (2009)
emphasize the importance of legal origin (common vs. civil law with the common law
no requiring any legal background for securitization). Maddaloni and Peydro (2011)
22An exception is Peersman and Wagner (2015). Using structural identification of different types of
financial shocks based on sign restrictions, they find that innovations in securitization markets have
important effects for U.S. business cycles.
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use legal obstacles to securitization in European countries as time invariant instruments
(similar to legal origin). Other main factors mentioned in the literature are demand from
investors (including foreign investors), banks’ transition to market-based funding from
deposit funding, financial innovation and the role of government in some specific cases
like the US (Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010, Altunbas et al. 2009; ECB, 2011).
The decision to securitize at the bank (or firm) level may affect the real economy
beyond the securitizing institution through different channels. The channels emphasized
by previous literature can be broadly categorized into two groups, depending on how
they may potentially affect economic output.
First, there are channels suggesting that securitization changes credit volume in the
economy. This may, in turn, lead to more economic activity if it alleviates financing
constraints of firms. To the contrary, it may also reduce economic activity if it causes
excessive debt burdens and defaults. There are various reasons for why securitization
activities are expected to affect the amount of credit in the economy, or more broadly,
lending conditions. Securitization lowers the risks on banks’ balance sheets and allows to
free economic and/or regulatory capital23. This should encourage banks to increase their
lending activities and charge lower rates to borrowers. Nadauld and Weisbach (2012)
provide micro-evidence for this, showing that securitization in the form of CLOs lowers
the price of corporate debt. Moreover, securitization techniques allow banks to improve
their risk management, which should reduce the cost of taking on risk. Loutskina and
Strahan (2009) find that in the U.S. securitization lowers the impact of funding shocks to
loan supply and Carbo-Valverde et al. (2015) show reduced credit constraints for Spanish
firms working with banks involved in ABS securitization before the recent financial crisis.
More broadly, there is evidence that banks pass on risk management benefits from
credit risk transfer techniques to borrowers (Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), Franke
and Krahnen (2005), Hirtle (2009) and Norden, Buston and Wagner (2014)).
Second, there are channels suggesting that securitization has a macroeconomic impact
by affecting credit quality. By reducing constraints at the side of banks, securitization
should lead to a more efficient allocation of capital in the economy (that is, capital flows
to the most productive firms and risk is efficiently spread among a diverse group of
23Securitization may also be driven by regulatory capital arbitrage in case there remains implicit
recourse on securitizers (Acharya et al. 2013), or when it leads to asset substitution (Jones (2000) and
Agostino and Mazzuca (2011)).
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investors). Stein (2010), in particular, argues that securitization enhances the allocation
of risks by transferring them from banks to outside investors. On the downside, there
is evidence that securitization reduces credit quality by undermining monitoring and
screening incentives of banks24. Marsh (2006) finds that the announcement effect of
a new bank loan is weakened when a bank actively uses securitization techniques,
consistent with informational problems. Keys et al. (2010) show that securitization
has negative effects on the screening incentives of lenders. However, Agarwal et al.
(2012) find no evidence of adverse selection in default risk in mortgage securitizations,
whereas Benmelech et al. (2012) find that adverse selection problems in corporate loan
securitizations are less severe than commonly believed.
The credit volume and credit quality channel of securitization are also echoed in the
literature on financial development (starting from King and Levine (1993) and surveyed
in Levine (2005)). While we focus here on a specific type of financial innovation, this
literature studies financial development more broadly. It emphasizes that financial devel-
opment can have a positive impact on economic growth by reducing financing constraints
(akin to the credit volume channel) and by affecting the efficiency of intermediation and
the allocation of capital in the economy (the credit quality channel).
In this paper we emphasize a new channel, which we term the credit composition
channel of securitization. Household loans, especially mortgages, are more homogenous
and can hence more readily be used as collateral in securitization pools (Loutskina, 2011).
This is in contrast to business loans, which typically are also more relationship-based.
Business loans require more monitoring and screening and are less easily securitized
without causing efficiency losses. We would thus expect that general developments in
securitization techniques have a bigger impact on household loans than on business loans.
Financial development is thus expected to reduce the cost of household credit relative to
business loans and increase relative credit availability. In equilibrium, this should lead
to a greater share of national output being used for consumption, instead of investment,
which may depress growth by reducing capital accumulation25.
24The reason is that post-securitization, the bank is no longer exposed to borrower risk, and hence
has less of an interest to make sure that borrowers are of good quality (Pennacchi, 1988).
25This of course does not preclude that household loans by themselves could spur economic activity
(for example, they may lead to higher demand for housing). It is only that if that comes at the expense
of financing business activities, growth may suffer (Mills (1987) shows that the social return to housing
capital is about half that to non-housing capital using U.S. data). Furthermore, the credit composition
channel is not orthogonal to the other two channels in that it relies on securitization affecting the volume
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We thus hypothesize that
Hypothesis 1: Countries with more securitization have lower economic growth as
securitization favors consumption in the economy at the expense of investment .
From this follow two more hypotheses, relating to securitization of household and
business loans separately:
Hypothesis 2: Countries with more securitization of household loans have lower eco-
nomic growth.
Hypothesis 3: Countries with more securitization of business loans have higher
economic growth.
3.3. Methodology and data
The data for this study has been collected from a number of sources, namely, the AB Alert
and CM Alert databases, World Development Indicators (WDI), Penn World Table 8,
the banking crisis database from Laeven and Valencia (2013), the World Bank regulation
and supervision database, the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), World
Government Indicators and Macroprudential index from Cerutti et al. (2015)26.
We conduct our empirical analysis by employing the following country fixed effects
panel data model:27
Growth i ,t = αi + β × Securitizationi,t−1 + δ′ ×Xi,t + θt + εi,t (3.1)
where the dependent variable Growth i ,t denotes economic growth. The subindices i
and t refer to country and time, respectively. Xi,t is a set of control variables at
country level28. We use GDP per capita growth as the main proxy for economic growth.
(or other characteristics) of either lending type. Rather, it is a general equilibrium consequence of the
two micro channels.
26We use World Bank’s WDI database as our base dataset and merge other databases starting with
our securitization database - to the WDI data. Our final sample is determined by data availability, but
not any other filters which may cause sample selection problems.
27When a Hausman test employed, fixed effects specification is selected over a random effects model
confirming the importance of unobserved heterogeneity.
28We adopt Fisher-type panel unit root tests (specifically for unbalanced panel) with two lags in the
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Alternatively, we consider growth rates of gross capital formation and growth rates of new
firm density29. The three measures come from the WDI. In our analysis of the tradeoff
between consumption and investment, we proxy the importance of consumption relative
to investment with the consumption share, which is defined as the ratio of consumption
to the sum of consumption and investment, constructed from Penn World Table 8.
We model the relationship between the consumption share and various securitization
variables similar to the growth regressions:
ConsumptionShare i ,t = αi + β × Securitizationi,t−1 + δ′ ×Xi,t + θt + εi,t (3.2)
Our variable of interest Securitization i ,t−1 represents total securitization issued in coun-
try i in year t−1. For our baseline analysis, summing up the amount of each securitization
issue in a given country of a given year, we obtain a yearly aggregate amount of secu-
ritization, divided by the size of the economy, as the primary proxy for securitization
intensity. In addition, we consider also the number of securitization deals normalized
by the GDP as an alternative. The rationale behind this proxy is that undertaking a
securitization requires a bank to adopt a new technology. Once in use, this technology is
expected to be used in future circumstances. Thus it is not so much the amount of funds
that in a specific securitization, but the fact that the bank has done a securitization.
We collect the data on securitization issuance from the AB Alert and CM Alert
databases30. The two databases include all securitizations in the world that are rated by
at least one major rating agency. The database distinguishes securitization issuances ac-
cording to the underlying collateral. The main types are public and private asset-backed
securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations
(CDO), sponsored both by financial and non-financial firms. The databases, however,
do not cover government-sponsored securitizations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and
asset-back commercial papers (ABCP).
The two databases contain essential information on the location of collateral, types
ADF regressions with drift. The tests for securitization variables and dependent variables strongly reject
the null hypothesis that all the panels contain unit roots.
29Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Firm density refers to new firm
registration per 1,000 people aged 15-64. The data on new firm density growth is available for a smaller
panel since 2004 and we hence only use it in our main regressions.
30See Table 3.9 for securitization issuances by collateral countries since 1995.
36
Methodology and data
of underlying collateral, the amount of assets securitized, and the identity of the issuer.
For our purpose, we classify securitizations into two groups, depending on whether the
underlying is a household loan or not31. Some choices had to be made since the distinction
between household and other credits is not always clear-cut. Next, following Maddaloni
and Peydro (2011), we create our securitization variables according to the nationality
of the securitized collateral32. All securitization variables are lagged by one period to
mitigate the concern of reverse causality. To capture possibly different effects of these two
types of securitization, in some regressions we replace the total securitization measure
with household and business securitization.
In order to further reduce endogeneity problems and deal with possible business
cycle effects, we also employ dynamic panel regressions as a robustness check. Following
the literature, we use system GMM estimation based on five-year or three-year non-
overlapping averages of all variables. System GMM estimation has various advantages
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Among others, it allows us to
control for both initial GDP of countries and lagged dependent variables. Moreover, it
can instrument all independent variables, including securitization measures, using their
lagged levels and first-differences (the internal instruments). The validity of instruments
is tested through Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions and AR(2) tests33.
We include a set of country-level control variables, which are commonly used in the
financial development literature (see, for example, Beck et al. (2014)). First, we include
indicators controlling for domestic credit and stock market development, measured by
domestic credit over GDP and stock traded over GDP, respectively. The credit variable
controls for any direct effect of securitization on economic growth, coming through a
general expansion in credit (but not taking into account changes in the composition).
In addition, we include trade over GDP to measure the openness of the economy and
inflation to control for macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, we control for government
expenditure defined as the share of government final consumption in GDP, urbanization
and education level of the country. All these macroeconomic controls come from WDI.
31See Table 3.10 for the final classification.
32We drop the deals that involve collateral from more than one country. Securitization measures are
matched to variables on economic growth according to the country and the year of issuance.
33In the specifications with five-year averages an AR(2) test cannot be run due to the short length of
the panel. When three-year averages are used instead of fiveyears, the tests are carried out and suggest
that instrumentation is valid.
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Since securitization activities may also affect output through increasing the likelihood
of crisis, we include dummies for banking crises from Laeven and Valencia (2013) to see
whether or not we capture this indirect effect. We also employ regulatory variables as
additional controls (from the World Bank regulation and supervision database (Barth
et al., 2013)) as a robustness check to make sure that the results are not driven by
a general deregulation trend in bank activities and capital stringency accompanied
by lax supervision and private monitoring. In addition, we include the country-level
nonperforming loans to gross loans taken from the GFDD to capture, at least partially,
the presence of the credit quality channel. In some robustness checks we also control
for bank competition measured by Boone indicator, bank soundness measured by bank
Z-score at the aggregate level, and bank credit to deposits, collected also from the
GFDD. Moreover, we include institutional quality collected from the World Government
Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2011), and macroprudential policies index borrowed from
Cerutti et al. (2015) in some sensitivity tests as extra controls. For details of data
sources and variable definitions, please refer to Table 3.11.
Finally, we include year dummies, θt, to control for year specific effects. For most
specifications, we estimate panel fixed effects models with standard errors clustered at
the country-level, relying on within country variations to show the relationship between
securitization and economic growth.
Figure 3.1 shows the trends of household and business securitization over the past two
decades. Household securitization is clearly the predominant form of securitization, at
least until the global financial crisis. During 2007 and 2008 both types of securitization
collapsed and the large difference in issuances between both securitization types by and
large disappeared.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of our sample. The sample consists of 104
countries. More than half of these countries used securitizations at least once over the
period of 1995 to 2012. Securitization over GDP has a sample mean of 0.378% and a
maximum of 14.381%. In terms of types of collaterals, household securitization is the
primary market segment. In particular, its sample mean, 0.242%, accounts for two-thirds
of average securitization over GDP.
Table 3.2 presents the pairwise correlation matrix between main variables. First, the
three measures of economic growth are positively correlated with each other, as expected.
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Second, Securitization over GDP is negatively correlated with GDP per capita growth
at the 10% significance level. Both types of securitization are negatively related to the
three measures of economic growth, though the correlation is not statistically significant.
Furthermore, the correlation between household and business securitization is rather
limited around 0.67734. It is also important to note that securitization measures and
consumption share are negatively correlated, albeit not significantly so. Finally, the
measure of the relative importance of consumption is strongly negatively correlated with
GDP, hinting at the potential importance of the composition channel.
While in our empirical analysis we exploit within country variation in securitization,
it is interesting to see whether there is also a relationship between securitization and
economic activity across countries. Figure 3.2 plots pre-crisis average of country-level
securitization and growth rates for the OECD countries, as a rather homogenous group.
We obtain a negative relationship, which is robust to the exclusion of outliers in the
securitization variable.
3.4. Empirical results
Table 3.3 presents our baseline results. In column 1, we use GDP per capita growth
as dependent variable and securitization over GDP as our variable of interest. The
estimated coefficient for securitization over GDP is negative and significant at the 10%
significance level. The economic effect of the negative association is considerable. More
specifically, a one standard deviation increase in securitization over GDP (1.357) is
associated with 0.18% decrease in GDP per capita growth, which is 7% of the mean
(1.357× 0.136/2.671) and 4.5% of the standard deviation. While not a very large effect,
the power of compounding implies an important impact on output in the medium-long
run.
Most of the significant control variables have the expected sign35. Higher trade
and urbanization increase economic growth, whereas higher inflation and government
34By means of comparison, in Sassi and Gasmi (2014) the correlation between household credit and
enterprise credit is around 0.76.
35In our baseline regressions, we did not include GDP per capita in levels as we employ country fixed
effects. When we include this variable as a control variable (unreported), the results are virtually the
same as in our baseline regressions. The GDP per capita variable is highly insignificant suggesting
country fixed-effects are capturing most of the variation there.
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expenditure and banking crisis are negatively correlated with GDP per capita growth.
Interestingly, domestic credit is negatively correlated with economic growth. This finding
is parallel to some recent evidence analyzing similar periods on possible negative asso-
ciation between macroeconomy and financial developments (measured by credit supply
or the importance of bank financing). Arcand et al. (2012) document non-linear and
possibly negative effects of credit to GDP as the dark side of financial development and
Beck et al. (2014) estimate negative coefficients for their financial intermediation variable
for the 1995-2007 period, though insignificant. In a more recent article, Langfield and
Pagano (2015) show that bank bias (which they measured by total bank assets over
market capitalization) may have negative effects of growth performances of economies.
Our analysis indicates that for fixed level of stock market development higher credit
is associated with negative growth, which is effectively higher relative credit to stock
market. So our negative coefficient may also be related to bank bias. Cecchetti and
Kharroubi (2015) provide evidence presenting a negative relationship between growth
of the financial sector and the total factor productivity (output per person employed).
Maybe more interestingly, this negative relationship becomes weaker once they control
for the share of the credit going to firms. Finally, one other explanation regarding
the negative coefficient on domestic credit variable is provided by Loayza and Ranciere
(2006), who differentiate between short- and long-term effects of financial intermediation
and document the short-term effects are negative and mainly caused by financial crisis
and volatility.
Columns 2 and 3 turn to the relationship between securitization and the supply side
of the economy, measured by the growth rates of gross capital formation and new firm
density. In each case we find a strong negative relationship. Specifically, a one standard
deviation increase in securitization reduces the growth rates of gross capital formation
and new firm formation by 0.74% and 2.23%. The effects are now significant at the
5% and 1% levels, respectively. This relatively stronger impact on the supply side may
indicate that our composition channel is at work.
In columns 4 to 6, we turn to the separate analysis of household and business
securitization. We find that household securitization is consistently negatively related to
all measures of economic growth. The coefficients for household securitization are in all
cases more negative than the one of total securitization. For GDP per capita growth, for
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example, the coefficient (significant at the 1% level) implies that a one standard deviation
increase in household securitization over GDP is associated with 0.46% decrease in GDP
per capita growth, which is 17% of the mean. The coefficients for business securitization
are all positive except in regression 5. The significance is only marginal in regression 4,
whereas there is no significance in the regressions for gross capital formation growth and
new firm density growth. This evidence thus suggests that household and business loan
securitizations have different implications for the macroeconomy.
In Table 3.4, we investigate through which channel(s) securitization may affect eco-
nomic growth. The credit composition channel predicts that the growth effect of securi-
tization comes through changing the relative importance of consumption to investment
in the economy. In column 1 and 2 we use as a dependent variable the share of
consumption over the sum of consumption and investment in national accounting. We
find the coefficient of securitization is positive though only marginally significant at 10%.
The effect is stronger for household securitization, which has a positive and significant
correlation with the consumption share, suggesting household securitization increases the
share of consumption. The effect for business securitization is negative but insignificant.
Together with the negative relationship between consumption and growth, this provides
further evidence in favor of the credit composition channel.
Securitization may affect economic growth through the credit quality channel, for
example because adverse selection and moral hazard results in financing of undesirable
high-risk projects. This may lower productivity, and lead to more defaults and less
growth. We proxy the credit quality channel through the ratio of nonperforming loans
to total loans at the country level, as a measure of increased bank risk and misallocation
of capital, possibly due to informational problems. Columns 3 and 4 show a negative
relationship of loan performance and growth. The results regarding securitization remain
similar, suggesting that the composition channel operates in addition to any credit quality
channel.
In our baseline regression, we include domestic credit as a control variable. Thus,
our results are net of any effects that may come through a change in the total amount
of credit in response to securitization. Consistent with this we find that in columns
5 and 6 that when domestic credit is excluded from the set of controls, the impact of
securitization on growth becomes larger (in absolute terms). The securitization variable
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now obtains a more negative coefficient of -0.215 and is significant at the 1% level. The
split-up shows that this is through a more negative impact of household securitization,
the impact of business securitization weakens and is insignificant.
3.4.1. Robustness
In this section we consider several alternative specifications of the benchmark growth
regressions of Table 3.3.
Table 3.5 contains various robustness checks of our results to specifications with
additional control variables. In columns 1 and 2 we add extra regulatory variables
to control for cross-country differences in bank regulation and supervision, which may
affect securitization as well as economic growth. The motivation is that the negative
association between securitization and economic growth may be driven by a general trend
towards deregulation and lax supervision. Specifically, we include variables for Activity
restrictions, Initial capital stringency, Supervisory powers and Private Monitoring from
the bank regulation and supervision database compiled by Barth et al. (2013). The
database is based on World Bank surveys on bank regulation and supervision over the
period 1999-2012. The results are qualitatively unchanged. In particular, we find aggre-
gate securitization to be negatively related to economic growth. Moreover, household
securitization is negatively and significantly related to GDP per capita growth, whereas
business securitization is positively related to economic growth though the effect is not
statistically significant. As for the regulatory variables, only activity restrictions have
significant and positive impacts on economic growth. The other regulatory variables are
not significant. For brevity, we omit the estimates for the standard set of controls. In
columns 3 and 4 we add population growth and the real interest rate accounting for
demographic changes and the stance of monetary policy. The results are very similar to
the first two regressions in the table. Both population growth and the real interest rate
are negatively associated with economic growth as expected.
We control for a number of extra, country specific covariates. First, we include
indicators of institutional quality, as a well-functioning legal system and institutional
system is a pre-requisite of financial innovation. In addition, we consider the usage
of macroprudential policies which affect the market environment and banks’ incentive
to undertake securitization. Following Han et al. (2015) and Gong et al. (2015) we
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include bank credit to deposits as the model in Han et al. (2015) suggests that banks
are more likely to securitize when constrained on the funding side (indicated by a high
loan to deposit ratio in Gong et al. (2015)). The results are virtually the same as our
baseline regressions. Finally in columns 7 and 8 we measure of the structure of the
banking system. In particular, we consider the Boone-indicator as a measure of bank
competition, and the Z-score as a measure of the soundness of the financial system. None
of the new control variables are significant, and the main results are robust.
Table 3.5 considers robustness of the main results by using alternative samples and
securitization measures. In columns 1 to 4 of panel A, we split the sample into two
groups according to median values of domestic credit to GDP variable in a given year
creating developed and less developed country groups. Our results suggest that the
relationship between securitization and economic growth is driven by financial developed
countries, as the results in columns 1 and 2 mimic our baseline findings whereas for less
developed group securitization variables are insignificant. This is unsurprising as most
securitization is done in financially developed countries. Indeed, about half of countries
in our sample do not securitize over the sample period. Pooling securitizing and non-
securitizing countries together may hence bias the estimation of the growth effect of
securitization.
In columns 5 and 6, we re-estimate our baseline model, including only countries with
at least one securitization deal in the sample period. We find that securitization is
negatively correlated with GDP per capita growth, though the effect is not statistically
significant. When decomposing the two types of securitization, we find economic growth
is negatively related to household securitization and positively related to business se-
curitization. These results reinforce our emphasis on the importance of the distinction
between household and business securitization. Finally, the U.S. has been by far the
largest user of securitization in the world. To see whether this drives our results, we
estimate the baseline model excluding the U.S in columns 7 and 8 and we find results
similar to the baseline analysis36.
Panel B of Table 3.6 contains regressions with alternative securitization variables. In
column 1, we use the log of the number of securitization deals as alternative measures
36The results are also similar when we exclude top five securitizing countries (U.S., Netherlands, UK,
Australia and Spain).
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of securitization intensity. The results are similar, although business securitization
loses its statistical significance. In columns 2 and 3, we exclude particular types of
securitization from the business securitization CDOs and CLOs respectively. Column 2
shows that business loan securitization becomes much more significant once CDOs are
excluded. This can be explained by the fact that CDOs are often based on synthetic
transactions (that is, no actual collateral is sold) and we would hence expect a weaker
relationship. Excluding CLOs (column 3), however, leads to a loss of significance for
business securitization. A weaker relationship is consistent with our priors since CLOs
have the ability to remove assets from the balance sheet that were previously very difficult
to sell (i.e., corporate loans). Hence, they should have a large effect on the behavior of
banks.
In column 4, we distinguish between securitization issued by non-financial firms and
financial institutions. We find that the significant results come from securitization of
financial institutions only, consistent with our argument that securitization has an effect
on economic growth by affecting behavior of financial institutions. In addition, the
coefficient of securitization by non-financial firms are positive and insignificant, indicating
the impact of securitization is largely coming through the credit composition channel.
The insignificant effect of securitization originated from the non-financial firms is also
in line with Lemmon et al. (2014), which document no evidence that firms increase
investment after securitization but funds from securitization are used to pay down debt.
In Table 3.7, to mitigate endogeneity concerns arising in our baseline regressions,
we employ dynamic panel regressions. Specifically, we use a two-step system GMM
estimator which instruments some or all independent variables or securitization variables
and domestic credit variable as discussed in the previous subsection. These regressions
also control for business cycle effects, as five-year or three-year non-overlapping averages
of all variables are used. The system GMM regressions show that aggregate securitization
has no significant effect on economic growth (in odd numbered regressions). However, in
column 2, where we instrument all independent variables with first two lags, the effect of
the two types of securitization individually is stronger than that in the baseline regres-
sion. The coefficient for household securitization is now -0.608, about twice (in absolute
terms) the value of the baseline regression. The coefficient for corporate securitization
is 1.882, more than twice its previous size, and now significant at the 1% level. These
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findings confirm our hypotheses that household securitization lowers economic growth
but business securitization spurs real activity.
This result is robust to alternative instrumentations of the independent variables and
specification of the lags used as internal instruments. In columns 3 and 4, we use only
the first lag of instrumented variables to make sure that we do not overfit. The results
are very similar and Hansen J statistics do not change much, reconfirming the validity of
instruments. The results remains the same in columns 5 and 6 when we reduce number
of instruments even further by only instrumenting securitization variables and domestic
credit variable and taking other independent variables as predetermined.
In regressions 7 to 10, we use 3-year averaged variables to increase the number of
observations and countries. Owing to the longer time-dimension in these regressions,
AR(2) can now also be reported -on top of Hansen J test- confirming the validity of
internal instruments. We further vary the number of instruments used by using the
first two lags in columns 7 and 8 and only the first lags in columns 9 and 10. In those
regressions, the results in terms of significance and direction of relationship are in line
with earlier results, but the absolute size of the coefficients is smaller (though still larger
in the baseline regressions). All in all, the system GMM results confirm that is important
to distinguish the type of underlying collateral when studying the impact of securitization
on growth.
The analysis so far indicates a negative relationship between securitization and eco-
nomic growth. Moreover, the relationship varies depending on the type of securitization.
The fact that household securitization is negatively related to growth but business
related securitization is positively or not correlated with economic growth suggests
differences in the macroeconomic response to securitizations. Previous research suggests
that corporate credit is more productive compared to household credit, which is mostly
used for consumption purposes (Beck et al., 2012). Moreover, Maddaloni and Peydro
(2011) show securitization affects banks’ lending behavior differentially, so that they
favor consumption-related credit provision (mortgages or consumer credit), which does
not directly turn into investment.
Countries with highly developed securitization markets, such as U.S. and UK, fell
into recessions when the securitization market collapsed in 2008. It is thus interesting
to examine whether the negative effects of securitization are due to the crisis period
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or whether they were already present before. In Table 3.8, we split the sample into
two subsamples, the period before the crisis (1995-2006) and the crisis period (2007-
2012). Column 1 shows that securitization had a negative impact on economic growth
in the pre-crisis period; the effect is even stronger. The split up, in column 2, shows
that the impact of household securitization is again more pronounced, and business
securitization is insignificant. The result for the crisis period in column 3 shows a weak
impact of aggregate securitization during the crisis. While the coefficients are not very
different from the baseline analysis, the significance drops. When we split securitization
as business and household securitization in column 4, only household securitization
is negatively correlated to GDP per capita growth in statistically significant terms.
Business securitization, on the other hand, has a positive coefficient though insignificant
with a low p-value of 0.154. An explanation for the weaker results may be that the
amount of securitization was much smaller in almost all of the countries during the crisis
period, as well that we now look at a much shorter sample period reducing the time
variance. In addition, during the crisis securitization markets did not function in an
orderly fashion, making it difficult to predict how they should (or should not) affect
growth.
To conclude the section, it is important to acknowledge some limitations of our
analysis. Our baseline methodology is panel fixed effects regressions, which relies on
strong exogeneity assumptions. Without an explicit identification strategy, the results
should be interpreted as correlations rather than causal relationships. Moreover, as our
data covers the period of 1995-2012, our panel regressions capture more medium-term
correlations between macro variables37. Yet, relying only on within country variation,
we avoid cross-country comparisons, which should reduce issues arising from unobserved
heterogeneity. Moreover, the use of lagged securitization variables should alleviate the
concern of reverse causality. The similarity of the results obtained in the dynamic panel
regressions, where securitization is internally instrumented and five-year and three-year
averaged variables are used, should provide additional assurance regarding endogeneity
of the securitization variables and long-term relevance of our findings.
37The use of securitization technology intensified from late 90s onwards, not leaving us a long time




This paper has analyzed the relationship between countries’ use of securitization tech-
nologies and their economic outcomes. We show that securitization is associated with
lower economic activity, as proxied by growth rates of GDP per capita, capital formation
and new firm density. Our results indicate that this effect is not driven by the breakdown
of securitization markets during the crisis, as it is also present in the pre-crisis period.
Importantly, different types of securitizations have different effects. Whereas securi-
tization of loans to households is negatively related to economic activity, securitization
of business loans has a weak positive effect on the economy. The findings are consistent
with the credit composition channel, by which securitization of non-business loans leads
to an increase in the share of credits flowing to households, as the cost of firm financing.
While this may spur demand in the short run, it will hamper investment and lead to
lower growth.
Our results carry clear policy messages. Securitization may not only have effects
on the parties immediately involved in the securitization process, but also for the wider
economy. Most importantly, the results suggest that the impact of securitization depends
on the underlying type of collateral. While securitization of business loans may encourage
investment and spur economic activity, securitization of consumer loans may at the ag-
gregate divert resources away from productive purposes. The ongoing debate on whether
to revive securitization should thus put a focus on which part of the securitization market
to stimulate. Policy makers clearly recognize the importance of fostering ”high-quality”
securitization, that is, securitizations that are transparent and include collateral of low
risk borrowers. Our analysis suggests that the authorities should not only care about
the securitization quality, but also whether the collateral is in the form of household or
business loans. If the objective is to stimulate growth and investment, the focus should
be on the latter.
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Table 3.1: Cross-country summary statistics
No. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per capita growth 1238 2.671 4.08 -17.545 38.057
Gross Capital Formation Growth 1126 5.218 15.144 -57.713 106.35
New Firm Density Growth 440 6.266 19.303 -45.455 133.333
Consumption share 1218 77.338 9.007 27.262 97.672
Securitization over GDP 1238 0.378 1.357 0 14.381
Household securitization over GDP 1238 0.242 0.992 0 9.956
Business securitization over GDP 1238 0.136 0.467 0 5.173
Ln(Securitization deals) 1238 0.654 1.312 0 8.005
Ln(Household securitization deals) 1238 0.46 1.128 0 7.394
Ln(Business securitization deals) 1238 0.476 1.067 0 7.231
Business securitization net of CDO over GDP 1238 0.095 0.313 0 3.442
Business securitization net of CLO over GDP 1238 0.122 0.428 0 4.74
Securitization by financial firms 1238 0.348 1.308 0 14.238
Securitization by nonfinancial firms 1238 0.04 0.164 0 2.513
Domestic credit to private sector 1238 70.362 53.804 3.829 319.461
Stocks traded over GDP 1238 36.043 68.969 0 741.584
Trade over GDP 1238 90.427 52.235 18.756 448.306
Inflation 1238 7.519 33.838 -4.863 1058.374
Government expenditure 1238 16.65 5.001 4.506 30.504
Urbanization 1238 64.34 20.01 10.072 100
Education 1238 87.191 23.702 16.477 160.619
Population growth 1233 1.072 1.504 -3.821 17.483
Real interest rate 1028 7.013 10.559 -71.205 97.474
Banking Crisis 1238 0.124 0.33 0 1
Activity restrictions 1043 7.136 2.052 3 12
Initial capital stringency 1060 2.136 0.794 0 3
Supervisory powers 870 11.04 2.408 4 16
Private Monitoring 993 8.182 1.393 4 11
Institutional quality 676 0.374 0.85 -1.177 1.986
Macroprudential index 676 1.72 1.599 0 8
Bank credit to deposits 676 108.618 47.056 30.63 364.67
Bank competition 1070 -0.059 0.403 -4.84 4.38
Bank soundness 1082 15.072 10.78 -7.31 65.36
NPL to gross loans 870 7.106 7.812 0.1 48.6
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Table 3.2: Pairwise correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) GDP per capita growth 1
(2) Gross Capital Formation Growth 0.598*** 1
(3) New Firm Density Growth 0.368*** 0.365*** 1
(4) Securitization over GDP -0.048* -0.025 -0.028 1
(5) Household securitization over GDP -0.046 -0.026 -0.015 0.967*** 1
(6) Business securitization over GDP -0.041 -0.019 -0.047 0.843*** 0.677*** 1
(7) Consumption share -0.078*** -0.109*** -0.047 -0.030 -0.022 -0.042 1
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Table 3.3: Securitization and the real economy
GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. New firm density growth is the growth rate of new
business entry density, which is the number of newly registered limited liability corporations per calendar year, normalized
by working age population. Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy
plus net changes in the level of inventories. Securitization over GDP is total securitization amount over GDP. Household
securitization over GDP is the total amount of securitization collateralized by household related underlying assets (such
as consumer loans, credit cards, mortgages etc.) over GDP. Business securitization over GDP is the total amount of
securitization collateralized by business related underlying assets (such as commercial mortgages, small business loans,
bank loans etc.) over GDP. Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector
by financial corporations. Stocks traded over GDP refers to the total value of shares traded during the period over GDP.
Trade over GDP is total trade over GDP. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer price indices. Government expenditure
is the general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Urbanization is the urban population (% of total
population). Education is the gross secondary education enrollment ratio. Banking crisis is a dummy variable that equals
1 if the country is in a banking crisis. All securitization related variables are lagged one period. Country and year fixed
effects are included in each specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. Robust P-values are reported




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Securitization over GDP -0.136* -0.542** -1.642***
(0.062) (0.045) (0.006)
Household securitization over GDP -0.344*** -0.653** -2.410***
(0.000) (0.039) (0.000)
Business securitization over GDP 0.371* -0.250 0.165
(0.086) (0.815) (0.911)
Domestic credit to private sector -0.027*** -0.083** 0.002 -0.027*** -0.083** -0.001
(0.003) (0.026) (0.964) (0.002) (0.026) (0.986)
Stocks traded over GDP 0.002 0.010 0.039* 0.001 0.010 0.038*
(0.661) (0.325) (0.060) (0.705) (0.341) (0.063)
Trade over GDP 0.032*** 0.130** 0.090 0.031*** 0.130** 0.091
(0.006) (0.015) (0.424) (0.006) (0.015) (0.412)
Inflation -0.013* -0.004 -0.728* -0.013* -0.004 -0.728*
(0.073) (0.572) (0.067) (0.074) (0.574) (0.067)
Government expenditure -0.257*** -0.155 -2.600*** -0.258*** -0.156 -2.587***
(0.000) (0.778) (0.001) (0.000) (0.777) (0.001)
Urbanization 0.236*** 0.925*** 1.453 0.239*** 0.926*** 1.471
(0.005) (0.006) (0.322) (0.005) (0.006) (0.318)
Education -0.000 -0.108** -0.389 -0.001 -0.108** -0.387
(0.980) (0.027) (0.201) (0.928) (0.027) (0.205)
Banking Crisis -1.610*** -4.116** 3.681 -1.635*** -4.130** 3.679
(0.002) (0.019) (0.200) (0.002) (0.018) (0.206)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,238 1,131 442 1,238 1,131 442
R-squared 0.333 0.228 0.274 0.335 0.228 0.275
Number of countries 104 96 78 104 96 78
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Table 3.4: Securitization channels
Consumption share is total consumption over the sum of investment and consumption. Securitization over GDP is total
securitization amount over GDP. Household securitization over GDP is the total amount of securitization collateralized
by household related underlying assets (such as consumer loans, credit cards, mortgages etc.) over GDP. Business
securitization over GDP is the total amount of securitization collateralized by business related underlying assets (such
as commercial mortgages, small business loans, bank loans etc.) over GDP. NPL to gross loans is aggregate bank non-
performing loans to gross loans in percentages. Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided
to the private sector by financial corporations. Stocks traded over GDP refers to the total value of shares traded during
the period over GDP. Trade over GDP is total trade over GDP. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer price indices.
Government expenditure is the general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Urbanization is the urban
population (% of total population). Education is the gross secondary education enrollment ratio. Banking crisis is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the country is in a banking crisis. Described control variables are included in the regressions
but not reported in the table. Government expenditure is not included in regressions 1 and 2. All securitization related
variables are lagged one period. Country and year fixed effects are included in each specification. Standard errors are
clustered at the country-level and P-values are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
VARIABLES Consumption share GDP per capita growth
Channels Credit composition channel Credit quality channel Credit volume channel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Securitization over GDP 0.204* -0.118 -0.215***
(0.062) (0.125) (0.002)
Household securitization over GDP 0.336** -0.328*** -0.408***
(0.027) (0.001) (0.000)
Business securitization over GDP -0.120 0.428** 0.253
(0.714) (0.030) (0.202)
NPL to Gross Loans -0.121*** -0.120***
(0.002) (0.002)
Domestic credit to private sector -0.025** -0.025** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,233 1,233 870 870 1,261 1,261
R-squared 0.201 0.201 0.429 0.431 0.319 0.321
Number of wbencode 103 103 85 85 104 104
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Table 3.8: Securitization before and after the global financial crisis
GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Securitization over GDP is total securitization amount
over GDP. Household securitization over GDP is the total amount of securitization collateralized by household related
underlying assets (such as consumer loans, credit cards, mortgages etc.) over GDP. Business securitization over GDP
is the total amount of securitization collateralized by business related underlying assets (such as commercial mortgages,
small business loans, bank loans etc.) over GDP. Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided
to the private sector by financial corporations. Stocks traded over GDP refers to the total value of shares traded during
the period over GDP. Trade over GDP is total trade over GDP. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer price indices.
Government expenditure is the general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Urbanization is the urban
population (% of total population). Education is the gross secondary education enrollment ratio. Banking crisis is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is in a banking crisis. In regressions 1 and 2, observations from years before
2007 and in regressions 3 and 4 from year after 2006 are used. All securitization related variables are lagged one period.
Country and year fixed effects are included in each specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and
P-values are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
VARIABLES GDP per capita growth
Sample periods 1995–2006 2007–2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Securitization over GDP -0.312** -0.126
(0.012) (0.170)
Household securitization over GDP -0.411** -0.328**
(0.017) (0.024)
Business securitization over GDP -0.049 0.387
(0.893) (0.154)
Domestic credit to private sector -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022 -0.026
(0.008) (0.008) (0.351) (0.257)
Stocks traded over GDP 0.015** 0.015** 0.003 0.002
(0.020) (0.022) (0.521) (0.680)
Trade over GDP 0.032** 0.031** 0.079** 0.080**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.043) (0.040)
Inflation -0.014* -0.014* 0.034 0.034
(0.081) (0.081) (0.679) (0.678)
Government expenditure -0.283*** -0.284*** -0.679** -0.676**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.014)
Urbanization 0.086 0.088 0.825** 0.842**
(0.441) (0.432) (0.049) (0.044)
Education 0.011 0.011 -0.043 -0.320
(0.519) (0.549) (0.499) (0.281)
Banking Crisis -2.034*** -2.033*** -8.282** -0.915
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.776)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 837 837 361 361
R-squared 0.245 0.245 0.110 0.466
Number of wbencode 98 98 89 87
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Figure 3.1: Composition of securitization: household related and business related
securitization
Figure 3.2: Economic growth and securitization intensity before the global financial crisis
Notes: The data is averaged over the period of 1995–2006 for the OECD countries. Graphs without




Table 3.9: Sample countries and securitization activities
The distribution of total amount of securitization issuances in millions of U.S. dollars
across countries over time.
Country 1995-2000 2001-2006 2007-2012 Country 1995-2000 2001-2006 2007-2012 Country 1995-2000 2001-2006 2007-2012
ARE 0 350 1599 ESP 20506 210705 178215 NOR 0 0 4370
ARG 2788 334 150 FIN 2540 997 637 NZL 1042 942 941
AUS 39912 181385 138601 FRA 44881 43744 21854 OMN 0 925 0
AUT 650 5785 4292 GBR 126893 827100 563392 PAK 250 0 0
BEL 5497 7596 12924 GRC 1100 13609 7198 PAN 186 150 1240
BHR 0 334 0 GTM 0 0 480 PER 550 1903 4094
BIH 0 0 110 HKG 2606 2122 2207 PHL 75 0 0
BLZ 0 45 0 IDN 886 0 9 POL 809 625 342
BRA 4093 6624 7977 IRL 0 711 29449 PRT 2400 38414 23143
CAN 17168 41527 43800 ISL 0 384 0 RUS 53 5219 6318
CHE 5943 7160 1515 ISR 0 37 0 SGP 225 4319 2345
CHL 150 40 0 ITA 20506 193268 88050 SLV 110 0 0
CHN 2117 403 0 JAM 125 100 50 SWE 2040 4346 4973
COL 887 206 0 JPN 44515 119289 160690 THA 753 664 421
CRI 0 63 0 KAZ 0 700 1400 TTO 0 150 0
CZE 0 218 0 KOR 3540 10697 6469 TUR 2489 9346 6463
DEU 25541 124317 162988 LUX 137 0 661 UKR 0 0 281
DNK 223 1132 21797 MEX 11780 1516 8105 USA 2189615 7181403 2773118
DOM 22 0 0 MYS 81 1344 315 VEN 4120 0 0
EGY 0 1554 0 NLD 21391 177768 159369 ZAF 361 7634 7355
Table 3.10: Types of securitization
Household related: Business related:
AL Auto Leases AC Aircraft-lease receivables MZ Mutual fund (12b-1) fees
AS Auto loans (subprime) AF Auto-fleet leases NM Net interest margin
AU Auto loans (prime) AK Airline-ticket receivables NR Natural resources
BO Boat loans BZ Bank loans (CLOs) PF Project finance
CN Consumer loans, unsecured CA Catastrophic risk RN Rent receipts
CR Credit cards CB Collateralized debt obligation RO Royalties
HE Home-equity loans CK Credit risk* RV Recreational-vehicle loans
HI Home-improvement loans CM Commercial MBS RY Remittances (by immigrants)
HL Home-equity lines of credit
CM Commercial MBS
(non-performing)
SA Servicer advance receivables
MH Manufactured housing loans DR Delinquent receivables* SB Small-business loans
MI Non-U.S. residential loans EL Equipment loans SC Small-business loans (Non-U.S.)





NE High-LTV (”no-equity”) loans EZ Export receivables (Other) TM Timeshare loans
NP Non-performing mortgages FE Miscellaneous* TO Toll-road receivables
RM Residential mortgages
(includes Alt-A)
FF Franchise fees TP Transportation
SM Subprime mortgages FL Franchise loans TR Trade receivables
ST Student loans FP Floorplan loans TU Truck loans
GC Guaranteed investment contract UT Utility receivables
HC Healthcare receivables* VI Viatical settlements
IN Insurance-premium loans WB Whole-business
MU Municipal leases WE Weather
Notes: Collateral codes are taken from the AB Alert and CM Alert databases. * indicates rather ambiguous types of
collateral, the exclusion of which does not affect our results.
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Table 3.11: Data descriptions and sources
* See the appendix for the details of underlying collaterals. All securitization variables are lagged one
period.
Variables Descriptions Sources
GDP per capita growth Real GDP per capita growth in percentages. WDI
Gross capital formation Gross capital formation (formerly gross
domestic investment) consists of outlays on
additions to the fixed assets of the economy
plus net changes in the level of inventories.
WDI
New firm density growth The new business entry density, which is the
number of newly registered limited liability
corporations per calendar year, normalized
by working age population.
WDI




Securitization over GDP Total amount of all rated asset-backed issues,
mortgage-backed issues, CDO’s and
securities collateralized by commercial and
multi-family properties over GDP. Excludes
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issues,
municipality issues and commercial papers*.
AB and CM
Alert
Household securitization over GDP Total amount of securitization collateralized
by household related underlying assets (such




Business securitization over GDP Total amount of securitization collateralized
by business related underlying assets (such as
commercial mortgages, small business loans,
bank loans etc.) over GDP*.
AB and CM
Alert
Ln(Securitization deals) Ln(1+ total number of securitization deals) AB and CM
Alert
Ln(Household securitization deals) Ln(1+ total number of securitization deals
collateralized by household related
underlying assets (such as consumer loans,
credit cards, mortgages etc.))*.
AB and CM
Alert
Ln(Business securitization deals) Ln(1+ total number of securitization deals
collateralized by business related underlying
assets (such as commercial mortgages, small




net of CDO over GDP
Total amount of business securitization net of







net of CLO over GDP
Total amount of business securitization net of




Securitization by financial firms Total amount of securitization issued by
financial firms over GDP.
AB and CM
Alert
Securitization by nonfinancial firms Total amount of securitization issued by
non-financial firms over GDP.
AB and CM
Alert
Domestic credit to private sector Domestic credit to private sector refers to
financial resources provided to the private
sector by financial corporations, such as
through loans, purchases of nonequity
securities, and trade credits and other
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for
repayment.
WDI
Stocks traded over GDP Stocks traded refers to the total value of
shares traded during the period. This
indicator complements the market
capitalization ratio by showing whether
market size is matched by trading.
WDI
Trade over GDP Trade is the sum of exports and imports of
goods and services measured as a share of
gross domestic product.
WDI
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). WDI
Government expenditure General government final consumption
expenditure (% of GDP).
WDI
Urbanization Urban population (% of total). WDI
Education Gross secondary education enrollment ratio
is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of
age, to the population of the age group that
officially corresponds to the level of
education shown.
WDI
Population growth Population growth (annual %) is the
exponential rate of growth of midyear
population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a
percentage.
WDI
Real interest rate Lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as
measured by the GDP deflator.
WDI
Banking crisis Dummy variable equals 1 if the country




Activity restriction Overall Restrictions on Banking Activities
regarding insurance, securities and real estate
activities of banks. From 3 to 12. Higher
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Initial capital stringency Whether certain funds may be used to
initially capitalize a bank and whether they







Supervisory powers Whether the supervisory authorities have the
authority to take specific actions to prevent
and correct problems. From 4 to 16. Higher






Private monitoring Whether the supervisory authorities have the
authority to take specific actions to prevent
and correct problems. From 4 to 11. Higher






Macroprudential index An index proxying the usage of
macroprudentail policies (such as
loan-to-value ratios, concentration limits




Bank credit to deposits Bank credit to bank deposits (%). GFDD
Bank competition Boone indicator. A measure of degree of
competition based on profit-efficiency in the
banking market. It is calculated as the
elasticity of profits to marginal costs. An
increase in the Boone indicator implies a
deterioration of the competitive conduct of
financial intermediaries.
GFDD
Bank soundness Bank Z-score which captures the probability
of default of a country’s commercial banking
system.
GFDD
NPL to Gross Loans Bank non-performing loans to gross loans at
the country-level (%).
GFDD
Institutional quality An aggregate governance indicator (including
different dimensions of governance such as
rule of law, control of corruption etc.)
proxying institutional quality (see Kaufmann







Systemic risk-taking at banks:
Evidence from the pricing of
syndicated loans
4.1. Introduction
Since the recent financial crisis is essentially a systemic crisis in which a large fraction
of banking sectors failed simultaneously and incurred huge economic and social costs,
systemic risk-taking at banks has become an important agenda for both policymakers and
researchers. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence of banks’ systemic risk-taking
in the market of syndicated lending. Specifically, we document systemic risk-taking from
the pricing of syndicated loan contracts. More importantly, we relate the incentive of
banks’ risk-taking to the “too-many-to-fail” bailout policy.
Banks may take systemic risk due to the fact that bank failure resolutions of regu-
latory agencies depend on whether the problem arises due to idiosyncratic or aggregate
reasons (Acharya and Torulmazer, 2007). According to a review of the history of bank
failures and resolution by Hoggarth, Reidhill and Sinclair (2004), in case of individual
bank failure, regulators usually stand alone and seek private sector resolutions, such as
merger and acquisition or liquidation. On the contrary, regulators often intervene in
systemic crises in the forms of liquidity support, blanket guarantees or capital injections,
when the cost of discontinuation of investment, fire sales and contagion outweighs the
cost of bailout. The bailout in joint bank failures, or “too-many-to-fail” summarized
in Acharya and Torulmazer (2007), may distort banks’ incentives ex-ante when banks
are aware of safety in similarity. Therefore, banks have strong incentives to make any
problem a system-wide one and therefore maximize the likelihood of joint failure and
hence collective bailout. A simple way for banks to take systemic risk is to expand
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aggregate exposure to the state of the economy. Essentially, banks can build up systemic
risk at the balance sheet by investing in the aggregate risk in assets.
How can we learn about systemic risk-taking from the pricing of loans? In absence
of systemic risk-taking, the compensation required for aggregate risk should be higher
than (or at least as high as) the compensation for idiosyncratic risk38. This is because
idiosyncratic risk is diversifiable (imperfectly though for banks, in contrast to stock
investors). Hence lending rates for aggregate exposure should be higher than for idiosyn-
cratic exposures. Suppose now that a “too-many-to-fail” bailout policy is in place, in
which the regulator bails out banks if they fail jointly (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007).
This provides incentives for banks to take on risks that make them more correlated.
Taking on aggregate risk is the easiest way to become correlated as most banks can
easily increase exposure to aggregate risk (by contrast, herding on for example a specific
exposure, like a certain region, will be more difficult for banks)39. Thus, the “too-
many-to-fail” guarantee provides a rationale for banks to charge lower lending rates for
taking on aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk. Evidence of lower lending rates for
aggregate risk, after properly accounting for other factors, is thus evidence for systemic
risk-taking at banks.
We empirically examine this question using a sample of the U.S. syndicated loans
from Dealscan over the period 1988 to 2011. Adopting equity volatility of the borrower
to proxy for the aggregate and idiosyncratic risks of the loan contract, we find that loan
spreads are positively associated with borrowers’ idiosyncratic risk whereas negatively
associated with aggregate risk, controlling for borrower, loan and lender specific factors
as well as year dummies. A one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic risk raises
the loan spread by 28 basis points, whereas a one standard deviation rise in aggregate risk
lowers the lending rate by 5 basis points. Although the spread undercut on aggregate risk
is not economically significant, the results imply that bank do not charge risk premium
but rather offer lending rate discount to aggregate risk, which to some extent reveals the
expected magnitude of the bailout subsidy a bank can obtain. Overall, the underpricing
38One reason to look at loan pricing is because there is a clear benchmark for different treatments of
idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. For instance, CAPM is a typical pricing benchmark based on portfolio
theory in absence of any distortion.
39We are fully aware of the distinction between the two terms, systematic risk and systemic risk,
as classified in Hansen (2012). Systematic risk is the aggregate risk which cannot be diversified away.
Systemic risk refers to the risk imposed by interbank correlation that may bring down the entire banking
industry. Still, the two concepts are intrinsically linked in our framework.
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of aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk can be taken as evidence of systemic risk-
taking at banks. This pricing pattern is robust to risk measures of equity volatility
estimated from CAPM regression and Fama-French three-factor regression. In addition,
we show that such pricing patterns are not driven by borrowers’ or lenders’ unobserved
heterogeneity as the results continue to hold when firm fixed effects or bank fixed effects
are included.
Public guarantees in systemic crises apply largely to banks40. Non-bank lenders hence
constitute an important control group. Consistent with systemic risk-taking driving the
results for the bank sample, we find that for the sample of non-bank lenders, lending
rates are higher for aggregate risk consistent with the traditional portfolio theory. This
provides strong evidence that results in the bank sample are driven by systemic risk-
taking incentives. In addition, we address the concern of incomparable clients of banks
and non-banks by applying the propensity score matching technique. Consistently, we
find different pricing patterns in a matched sample of loans borrowed by similar firms
but issued by banks and non-bank lenders.
An important motive for systemic risk-taking is the “too-many-to-fail” policy, which
provides lowly correlated banks a rationale to become correlated in order to benefit from
the bailout subsidy (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). Consistent with this, interacting
borrowers’ aggregate and idiosyncratic risks with a market-based interbank correlation
dummy, we find that less correlated banks charge lower spreads on aggregate risk relative
to more correlated banks. When splitting the sample into two subsamples of highly and
lowly correlated bank, we find only lowly correlated banks offer interest rate discounts on
aggregate risk. The test of the impact of interbank correlations on loan pricing restricts
the sample to publicly traded banks. To test the “too-many-to-fail” effect in a more
general sample, we rely on bank accounting variables and test whether small banks are
more aggressive in systemic risk-taking, a proposition in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007).
Interacting a bank size dummy with borrowers’ aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, we find
that smaller banks charge lower spreads on aggregate risk relative to larger banks, in
40Although large non-bank firms such as AIG, General Motors and Chrysler were also bailed
out in the recent financial crisis, they accounted for a very small fraction of bailout recipients of
the failed financial institutions. Therefore, the likelihood of being rescued by the public guarantee
remains low for non-bank lenders. For the list of bailout recipients, please visit ProPublica
http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list. To track the list of bailout bank in the Capital Purchase
Program, please visit http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/
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line with the prediction of “too-many-to-fail” story. It is notably that the large banks
require more compensation for both aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, different from the
standard “too-big-to-fail” story.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, in spite of fruitful studies
on bank risk-taking in general (see Laeven and Levine, 2009; Keeley, 1990; Gropp,
Gruendl and Guettler, 2013; Gropp, Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010; DeYoung, Peng and
Yan, 2013; Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibáñez, 2010), the specific research on
bank systemic risk-taking has been concentrated on theoretical models as it is challenging
to empirically identify systemic risk-taking behaviors in the real world. This paper adds
new empirical evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from the syndicated loan market.
We illustrate systemic risk-taking from the underpricing of aggregate risk of loans, in
contrast to Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011) who document bank systemic risk-taking
based on the interconnectedness of banks which is directly constructed from syndicated
loan portfolios.
More broadly, this paper is related to the discussion of the impact of government
guarantees on bank risk-taking. Banking theory suggests two opposite effects coexist.
On the one hand, government support augments a bank’s charter value and therefore
discourages risk-taking (Keeley, 1990). On the other hand, public support mitigates
market discipline as the incentive for investors to monitor the risk-shifting at the bank
is reduced (Merton, 1977; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler,
2013; Brandao-Marques, Correa and Sapriza, 2012). Empirical studies present, however,
mixed results, indicating that the net effect of government guarantees on risk-taking is
ambiguous and depends on which effect dominates (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003). This
paper adds new empirical evidence that the moral hazard effect of the government
support dominates as banks protected by the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee tend to take
systemic risk aggressively. This is related to the finding that suppoted banks charge lower
loan spreads relative to a market benchmark by Gadanecz, Tsatsaronis, and Altunbas
(2012).
Last, though the “too-many-to-fail” problem has drawn extensive attention in bank-
ing regulation especially since the recent financial crisis (Vives, 2011), empirical work
testing this theory remains scarce. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first which unveils evidence of the ex-ante effect of “too-many-to-fail” that banks may
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intentionally extract bailout subsidies by taking systemic risk in expectation of the “too-
many-to-fail” guarantee. Brown and Dinc (2009) is related to our paper, documenting
evidence of the ex-post effect of “too-many-to-fail” that regulators are reluctant to close
failed banks when other banks in the country are also weak.
Our empirical findings suggest large systemic risk-taking effect of public guarantees.
Importantly, the findings unveil distortions as banks inefficiently underprice aggregate
risk. Therefore, this paper has messages for public policy debate over banking regulation.
First, banking regulation should focus on macroprudential regulation and operate at the
collective level. Second, small and lowly correlated banks have been taking systemic risk
aggressively and therefore need more regulator’s attention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets out testable
hypotheses. Section 4.3 presents the data, methodology and summary statistics. Section
4.4 examines evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from loan pricing. Section 4.5
analyzes the incentive for systemic risk-taking and highlights the importance of public
guarantees. Section 4.6 tests the impacts of the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee on systemic
risk-taking by examining the pricing patterns of banks of different interbank correlations
and sizes. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. Hypotheses development
According to the portfolio theory, under the assumption of perfect diversification and no
distortions, aggregate risk of the asset should be priced whereas diversifiable idiosyncratic
risk should not. However, in the context of bank loans, idiosyncratic risk of the loans is
likely to be priced but never more than aggregate risk for two reasons. First, most loan
portfolios are imperfectly diversified or even limitedly diversified. Second, banks usually
bear the losses from firm-specific defaults. However, if a bank expects to obtain bailout
subsidies in a systemic crisis, then it may require lower compensation for aggregate risk
relative to idiosyncratic risk as banks are less worried about losses in aggregate shocks in
expectation of joint failure and collective bailout. Overall, distortions from the bailout
policy lead banks to take systemic risk and underprice aggregate risk. This leads to the
first hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1: Banks require lower loan spreads for aggregate risk relative to idiosyn-
cratic risk, indicating systemic risk-taking.
Public guarantees can be a candidate for driving systemic risk-taking at banks.
Since bailout guarantees are challenging to measure or proxy in a direct way, we use
the presence (or absence) of public guarantees over banks (non-bank lenders) to test
the impact of guarantees on risk-taking. In particular, banks are protected by explicit
or implicit public guarantees that regulators and government will support them in a
systemic crisis in the forms of capital injection or liquidity support. Hence banks could
have incentives to take systemic risk. On the contrary, non-bank lenders which are
not protected by any public guarantee should have no incentive to take systemic risk
and therefore charge higher spreads for aggregate risk. Taken together, we propose the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Non-bank lenders which are not protected by public guarantees do not
take systemic risk and require higher loan spreads for aggregate risk relative to idiosyn-
cratic risk.
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) model the “too-many-to-fail” problem that a bank
regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out failed banks when the number of failures
is large, whereas the probability of the collective bailout is low when the number of
bank failures is small, as failed banks can be acquired by surviving banks. The ex-post
optimal bailout exists in the circumstance that the misallocation cost of liquidating bank
assets to outside investors in case of systemic banking crisis exceeds the cost of injecting
funds. Therefore, the bailout expectation creates incentives for banks to herd ex-ante in
order to maximize the likelihood of failing together and therefore collective bailout. To
test that systemic risk-taking is driven by the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee, we predict
less correlated banks may be more aggressive in taking systemic risk as the marginal
benefit of increased systemic risk could substantially raise the likelihood of joint failure
and hence the collective bailout subsidy.
Hypothesis 3: Less correlated banks take systemic risk more aggressively relative to
more correlated banks.
To corroborate the argument of “too-many-to-fail” effect, we predict smaller banks
charge lower lending rates to aggregate risk, based on the prediction that smaller banks
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have stronger incentives to take systemic risk in Acharya and Yozulmazer (2007), differ-
ent from the “too-big-to-fail” effect. This is because that the bailout subsidy increases in
the systemic risk-taking for small banks when big banks also fail but it does not increase
for big banks when small banks fail as big banks can acquire failed small banks (Acharya
and Yorulmazer, 2007)
Hypothesis 4: Smaller banks take systemic risk more aggressively relative to larger
banks.
4.3. Data, Methodology and Summary Statistics
4.3.1. Data
Syndicated loans provide an ideal laboratory to test systemic risk-taking at banks. First,
syndicated loans are a vital source of corporate finance for large U.S. corporations
(Sufi, 2007; Becker and Ivashina, 2014) and represent a substantial fraction of bank
loan portfolios (Ivashina, 2009). Second, for each loan contract Dealscan provides rich
information about the identities of borrowers and lenders which allow me to control for
a variety of borrowers’ and lenders’ characteristics. Specifically, we can study how the
characteristics of the banks (investors) of loans (assets) may affect the pricing. Last,
non-bank lenders which are active in the syndicated loan market but are unprotected by
bailout policies naturally constitute a control group for our test of the impact of public
guarantees on systemic risk-taking.
Obtaining syndicated loan data from LPC Dealscan, we focus on U.S. firms borrowing
from U.S. banks over the period between 1988 and 201141. We exclude loans borrowed by
companies in the financial sector from the sample (SIC codes 6000 to 6400, Finance and
Insurance). Syndicated loans are usually structured in a number of facilities, also called
tranches. We treat facilities in each deal as different loans because spreads, identity
of lenders and other contractual features often vary within a syndicated loan deal42.
Therefore, each observation in the regressions corresponds to a syndicated loan facility.
41Before 1987, the coverage of Deanscan is uneven. For an overview of the Dealscan database, see
Strahan (1999).
42This is a common practice in the loan pricing literature. See similar analyses in Carey and Nini
(2007), Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008), Santos (2011), Gaul and Uysal (2014).
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By merging Dealscan with Compustat, we have detailed annual accounting infor-
mation of the borrowers43. Compustat provides annual report data of publicly listed
American companies, of which information problems are generally less severe than pri-
vately held firms.
In addition, we restrict our sample to loans taken out by companies of which stocks are
actively traded because the proxies for idiosyncratic and aggregate risks are constructed
based on stock market information. To calculate the equity volatility of borrowers,
we collect daily stock return data from CRSP over the year leading up to the facility
activation date for borrowers listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ44. We drop out
borrowers with less than 100 trading days available in the event window45. Moreover,
we collect Fama-French Factors from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Though our analysis of systemic risk-taking assumes a loan is made by a single
lender, most of loans in our sample are syndicated by a number of leader arrangers and
participants. This is less of a problem given our focus on the characteristics of lead
arrangers. According to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Sufi (2007) and Santos and
Winton (2008), leader arrangers are delegated to collect information and monitor the
borrower on behalf of the syndicate46. In addition, leader arrangers set lending rates
and non-pricing loan terms. By contrast, participants play a rather passive role in the
syndicate. Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that the lead arranger plays the role
of the single bank lender in bilateral corporate lending of assessing the credit worthiness
of the borrower and making decisions on risk-taking. Moreover, we restrict our sample
to loans originated by a single lead arranger and exclude loans originated by multiple
lead arrangers in order to clearly capture the effect of the lender’s characteristics on
loan pricing47. We manually match lead banks in Dealscan with commercial banks in
43We are indebted to Sudheer Chava and Michael Roberts for providing the link between Dealscan
with Compustat, see Chava and Roberts (2008).
44We link LPC Deanscan with Compustat via GVKEY. Next, we use PERMNO to link Compustat
with CRSP.
45Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that a fairly long event window is required to measure the
volatility that is publicly observed by corporate bond investors.
46Dealscan indicates the role of each lender. We follow the classification rule in Cai, Saunders
and Steffen (2011). If the variable LeadArrangerCredit indicates “Yes”, a lender is classified as a
lead arranger. We correct for the role of lenders of loans that LeadArrangerCredit indicates “Yes”
but “LenderRole” falls into participants as non-lead arrangers. In addition, if no lead arranger is
identified, we treat a lender as a lead arranger if its “LenderRole” is classified as following items: Admin
agent, Agent, Arranger, Bookrunner, Coordinating arranger, Lead arranger, Lead bank, Lead manager,
Mandated arranger, Mandated Lead arranger.
47It makes little sense to aggregate lenders’ characteristics (both leader arranger and participants) for
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Call reports, depending on bank names, geographical locations and operating dates. We
complement the unmatched sample of banking holding companies with Federal Reserve
Y-9C reports. Additionally, we control for mergers and acquisition by matching the loan
of the acquired lender to the accounting information of its acquirer.
To calculate the stock market based measure of interbank correlation, we collect
banks’ daily stock return data from CRSP one year preceding to the quarter of loan
origination and the S&P 500 banking sector index from Datastream dating back to the
last quarter of 1989. We link bank stock return with Call Reports and FY Y9C using the
CRSP-FRB link from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In particular, we match
commercial banks that are subsidiaries of the listed bank holding companies with the
stock return data of their parent companies, similar to Lin and Paravisini (2012).
4.3.2. Loan pricing model
In the empirical analysis, we estimate the following loan pricing model:















where f , i, b and t denote facility, firm, bank and year, respectively. The dependent
variable, LoanSpread , is the all-in-drawn spread in Dealscan which denotes an interest
rate spread over LIBOR measured in basis points. It is summarized by Dealscan as
a measure of overall costs of the loan, accounting for both one time and recurring
fees. IdioVol and AggVol represent idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, respectively48.
Moreover, we include firm specific variables (Firmi), loan specific variables (Loanf )
and bank specific variables (Bankb). We also include year dummies T throughout all
specifications. ε is the error term. We estimate the baseline loan pricing model by cross-
sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the lender level to correct for correlation across observations of a
given lender, though the results hold when clustering at the levels of borrowers or the
loans with multiple lead arrangers. Nevertheless, our baseline results hold for loans granted by multiple
lead arrangers.
48We do not include credit ratings of the borrower. The reason is that in principle credit rating should
perfectly capture the default risk and therefore both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks would enter the
regression insignificantly.
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pairs of borrower-lender.
To compute the key independent variables, idiosyncratic and aggregate risks of the
borrower, we rely on the borrower’s equity volatilities which are forward-looking and are
driven by market information. The idea is that we can think of the holder of risky debt
as the owner of riskless bonds who have issued put options to the holder of firm equity
(Merton, 1974). The strike price equals the face value of the debt and reflects limited
liability of equity holders in the event of default. Increased equity volatility raises the
value of put option, benefiting the equity holder at the expense of the debt holder. Hence
a firm with more volatile equity is more likely to reach the bound condition for default.
In addition, there is a burgeoning literature that applies equity volatility to explain
credit spreads. In a seminal paper Campbell and Taksler (2003) find evidence that
equity volatility, especially idiosyncratic equity volatility, has substantial explanatory
power for corporate bond yields. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) and Ericsson, Jacob
and Oviedo (2009) apply the same logic to credit default swap (CDS) pricing and find
equity volatility is an important determinant of CDS spreads. Equity volatility has also
been applied in empirical banking literature. Gaul and Uysal (2013) relate total equity
volatility with loan spreads to explain the “global loan pricing puzzle” in Carey and
Nini (2007). Santos and Winton (2013) use stock volatility as a proxy of the borrower’s
default risk. Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2013) also use equity beta to explain the
cost of credit lines.
To decompose borrowers’ equity volatility into idiosyncratic and aggregate compo-
nents to proxy idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, respectively, we run a standard CAPM
regression as follows:
ri,d − rfd = β
CAPM
i,d × (rmd − r
f





d represent individual stock daily return, market return calculated
as the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in CRSP and
risk free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rate, respectively. We define
the idiosyncratic volatility as standard deviation of the residual, IdioVolCAPM =SD(ε).
In addition, we define the aggregate risk as the product of beta and market volatility,
AggVolCAPM =βCAPM ×MarketVol , where MarketVol is the standard deviation of market
excess return (SD(rm − rf )).
Alternatively, we adopt Fama French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993)
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using the following regression:
ri,d − rfd = αi,d + β
MKT
i,d ×MKT d + βSMBi,d × SMBd + βHMLi,d ×HMLd + εi,d (4.3)
Where the market factor MKTd is the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks from CRSP minus the one-month Treasury bill rate, the size factor
SMBd is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on
the three big portfolios, the value factor HMLd is the average return on the two value
portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios, respectively. We stick to
the standard deviation of the residual IdioVolFF = SD(ε) as the idiosyncratic volatility.
On the other hand, following Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2012) we define the aggregate
risk in the multifactor model as the total volatility that is attributable to Fama French
factors and the factors’ cross-covariances, AggVolFF =
√
(TotalVol)2 − (IdioVolFF )2. In
the end, we annualize all equity volatilities by a multiplier of
√
252 as daily stock returns
are used.
We include a number of firm level controls that may affect the lending interest rates.
Log(Sales) is the logarithm of the firm’s sales at close in millions of dollars. Larger
firms are more informationally transparent, therefore we expect larger borrowers have
lower spreads. Next, LEVERAGE is a ratio of total debts to total assets. Highly
leveraged firms are more likely to default and hence are expected to be charged a higher
lending rate. Besides, we control for PROFMARGIN which is defined as a ratio of profit
margin to firm sales, and ROA which is return on assets, to measure the performance
and profitability of the borrower. As a highly profitable firm is safer and less likely
to fall into financial distress, it should be charged a lower spread. As for the firm
specific controls that affect loss given default (LGD), we include new working capital
and tangibles assets. NWC measures a ratio of net working capital to total assets.
Firms with more net working capital are expected to lose less value in the event of
default. In addition, TANGIBLE measures a fraction of tangible assets to total assets.
Borrowers with a higher fraction of tangible assets are more informationally transparent
(Morgan, 2001) and have higher values in the event of default as the value of intangible
assets are much volatile. Therefore we expect a lower spread on the loans taken out
by borrowers with a higher fraction of tangible assets. We control for Market-to-Book
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ratio, MKTBOOK, an imperfect proxy of Tobin’s q, which is a ratio of the market value
of a firm to its accounting value. We expect a firm with a higher Market-to-Book ratio
to have lower spreads. Finally, we include industry dummies that classify borrowers
into ten sectors based on 4-digit SIC codes, considering that loss given default (LGD) is
strongly correlated with industry characteristics (Hertzel and Officer, 2012; James and
Kizilaslan, 2014). Our results hold if we alternatively use dummy variables for two-digit
SIC industry groups.
Even though nonpricing loan specific variables are jointly determined with loan
spreads and therefore are endogenous, we include these contractual terms. We include
Log(FacilitySize), measured by the log of the facility amount in millions of dollars. Large
loans are likely to be associated with greater credit risk in the underlying project and
lower liquidity, but could also be borrowed by larger firms which have more cush-
ions against adverse shocks. Therefore, the impact of loan size on loan pricing is
not unambiguous. Additionally, we include MATURITY which is the maturity of the
facility in years. The effect of maturity on loan spreads is also ambiguous. Next,
we use the number of lenders in a facility (#Lenders) and the number of facilities
within a deal (#Facilities) to proxy the syndicated structure. To measure the liquidity
exposure of each facility, we classify a loan as a line of credit (REVOLVER) or a term
loan (TERMLOAN)49. Moreover, we include dummy variables that indicate whether
a loan is senior (SENIOR) in the borrowers’ liability structure and whether the loan
is secured by collateral (SECURED). Seniority and collateral may reduce the lenders’
loss in the event of borrower default and therefore reduce lending rates, however, the
contractual arrangement may be required ex-ante to protect lenders towards specifically
risky borrowers. Therefore, the relation between seniority, collateral and loan pricing is
an empirical question. Last, we control for loan purpose dummies into five categories:
Corporate Purpose, Debt Repayment, Takeover, Working Capital and Other.
As the loan contract is negotiated between the borrowers and lenders, lenders’ char-
acteristics may also affect contract terms and have been incorporated into the analysis
of loan pricing recently. Analyzing the effect of banks’ financial health on loan spreads,
49In particular, a loan is classified as a revolver is the loan type is expressed in Dealscan as “364-
Day Facility”, “Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Term Loan”, “Demand
Loan”, “Limited Line”. Alternatively, a loan is defined as a term loan if the loan type is recorded as
“Term Loan”, “Term Loan A”, “Term Loan B”, “Term Loan C”, “Term Loan F”, “Delay Draw Term
Loan”.
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Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) find less capitalized bank charge higher spreads
than well capitalized banks. Examining how bank capital, borrower cash flow and their
interaction affect loan pricing, Santos and Winton (2013) show that less capitalized
banks charge relatively more for borrowers with low cash flow but offer discounts for
borrowers with high cash flow. Santos (2010) emphasizes the impacts of bank losses
on loan contracts. He shows evidence of credit crunch in the subprime crisis that even
though firms paid higher loan spreads and took out smaller loans during the subprime
crisis, the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms that borrowed from banks that
incurred large losses. In this study we consider following bank specific variables of lead
arrangers. First, we include SizeBK as the logarithm of bank total assets in millions
of dollars. Large banks usually have diversified portfolios and good risk management,
therefore we expect large banks charge low lending rates. Next, we control for CapitalBK,
denoted as a ratio of bank capital to total assets. Well capitalized banks have more
capital buffer and therefore are expected to charge a lower spread. In addition, we use
NPLBK, a ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets, as a measure of bank credit risk.
Risky banks may charge additional compensation for undertaking extra risk. Hence, we
expect banks with a higher proportion of nonperforming loans to charge a higher spread.
We also use ZscoreBK as a direct measure of bank insolvancy risk. We calculate Z score
following Laeven and Levine (2009) but use an eight-quarter rolling window. Moreover,
we include a bank profitability measure ROABK. More profitable banks are expected
to charge a lower rate. To control for the impact of bank liquidity on loan rates, we
include LiquidityBK to measure the liquidity of bank assets, which is a ratio of sum
of liquid securities and cash to total assets. Besides, we use the growth rate of loans
(LoanGrowthBK) to measure investment opportunities of the lender. In the end we
include CostOfFundBK which is total interest expenses over total liabilities to measure
funding costs.
In particular, we use the accounting information of the borrower and lenders from the
fiscal year ending in the calendar year t−1 for loans made in calendar year t. To eliminate
the bias from outliers, we winsorize loan spreads, firm and bank specific variables and
borrowers’ equity volatilities at 1 and 99 percentile levels50. We include year dummies
to capture time trends throughout the analysis as Santos (2011) has shown the business
50See Appendix Table A.1 for detailed information of variables.
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cycle effect on loan contracts.
4.3.3. Summary Statistics
The final sample consists of 11,323 facilities taken out of 4,192 publicly listed U.S.
nonfinancial firms from 464 U.S. lead banks over the period 1988 to 2011. Table 4.1
presents summary statistics of the sample. The average all-in-drawn spread is 207 basis
points over LIBOR. The average CAPM idiosyncratic volatility is 0.554, very close to the
mean of total volatility. Since market is usually relatively stable, the average aggregate
volatility which is the product of Beta and market volatility is rather small (0.116), much
smaller than the average beta (0.758). It is worth noting that aggregate volatility could
be negative as the beta of some borrowers is negative. Overall, the idiosyncratic and
aggregate volatilities estimated from CAPM and Fama French three-factor models are
quite similar.
Looking at firm level controls, we find the average log of firm total assets is 5.611.
The mean of borrowers’ leverage is 28.035%. The profit margin is highly skewed, with
a mean of -0.871% and a median of 3.211%. The mean of net working capital to total
assets and tangible assets to total assets are 21.107% and 69.036%, respectively. The
average Market-to-Book ratio is 1.782.
We turn to the loan controls in the sample. The average logarithm of facility amount
is 3.805. It is worth noting that the log of facility size can be negative when the loan is
pretty small. Syndicated loans in the sample have an average maturity of 3.589 years. In
addition, on average each syndicate has 6 lenders and is structured into 1.763 facilities.
Looking at the loan types, 73% of loans are lines of credit while 24% are term loans.
Almost all loans are senior in the borrower’s liability structure. In the end, 75% of loans
are secured by collateral.
We check the sample characteristics of banks. Except bank size and z score which
are log adjusted, the rest bank specific variables are expressed in ratios. Banks are much
larger as the average log of bank total assets is 11.269. The average equity to asset ratio
is 7.524%. Both the average share of nonperforming loans to gross loans and the average
ROA are 0.952%. The mean of bank Z score is 3.179. Liquid assets account for 18.716%
of total assets. The median of loan growth rate is 9.191% although the average is rather
high at 20.476%. The average bank has the cost of funds at 3.390%. As not all banks are
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listed and traded in stock exchanges, we have the information of interbank correlation
for approximately 9321 facilities, of which the average interbank correlation is 0.735.
4.4. Evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from the pricing of
idiosyncratic and aggregate risks
In this section, we apply the baseline loan pricing model to examine bank systemic risk-
taking. Table 4.2 reports the results using idiosyncratic and aggregate risks estimated
from the CAPM regression. In all specifications, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions
that pool together all valid observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn
spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the lender level and reported in
parentheses below coefficients. In column 1, we regress loan spreads on equity volatilities
and year dummies only. The coefficient of the idiosyncratic volatility is positive and
significant, indicating banks charge risk premium for bearing idiosyncratic default risk of
the borrower. On the contrary, the coefficient of aggregate risk is negative and significant,
suggesting that banks do not charge risk premium but rather offer lending rate discounts
to aggregate exposure, consistent with hypothesis 1 that banks take systemic risk. In
column 2, the main results are insensitive to the inclusion of firm level balance sheet
variables and industry dummies51. In addition, the firm characteristics have expected
signs and are mostly significant. In particular, we find that larger firms, firms with
higher profit margins, and less leveraged firms pay lower loan spreads. Proxies for net
working capital and tangible assets have expected signs and are statistically significant.
The market to book ratio is marginally significant and negatively associated with loan
spreads. In column 3 we further control for loan specific variables, despite that loan
spreads and other contract terms are simultaneously determined. The hypothesis 1
continues to be supported. Moreover, we find that larger loans and loans with longer
maturity are charged at a higher rate. The two proxies of syndicate structure have
opposite effects. In particular, loans of more lenders in the syndicate are associated
with lower spreads, whereas loans with more facilities are more expensive. Moreover,
lines of credit are generally cheaper. A loan is much cheaper if it is senior when it
51The number of observations in the regressions drops due missing values in industry classification.
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ensures the priority of the lender to claim to residual value in the event of borrower
bankruptcy. Furthermore, a secured loan is charged a higher spread than a similar one
without collateral probably because only risky borrowers are required for collateral and
are ex-ante charged a risk premium. In column 4, we add bank level controls, provided
that the lender’ characteristics may have impacts on loan pricing. As a result, our main
results of systemic risk-taking continue to hold. Specifically, banks do charge a sizable
spread on idiosyncratic risk. A firm of which idiosyncratic risk is one standard deviation
(0.303) greater than the sample mean pays 28 (= 91.778× 0.303) basis points extra. By
contrast, a one standard deviation (0.101) increase in the aggregate risk lowers the loan
interest rate by 4 (= −42.850 × 0.101) basis points. Though the spread undercut on
aggregate risk is not economically significant, it indicates that banks do not charge risk
premium to cover the potential losses to aggregate shocks. Furthermore, we find that
larger banks, well-capitalized banks, banks with high costs of funding and banks with
high loan growth rates charge lower spreads while risky banks charge relatively higher
spreads.
We do the same exercise using equity volatilities estimated from the Fama French
three-factor model in Table 4.3. Overall, all estimates preserve the sign, significance and
magnitude with the baseline results using CAPM equity volatility. Again, the results
hold when standard errors are clustered at the bank level (or firm-bank pair level) to
correct for correlation across a given bank (bank-firm pair). For brevity, in the following
output tables we do not report the estimated coefficients of firm, loan and bank specific
control variables.
Table 4.4 shows that our results are insensitive to various alternative estimates of id-
iosyncratic and aggregate risks. Even though equity beta is not comparable to volatility,
we use CAPM beta (BetaCAPM ) and market beta in the Fama French three-factor model
(BetaMKT ) as alternative measures of aggregate exposure. We find similar evidence
that banks charge lower spreads for aggregate risk in columns 1 and 2. In addition,
controlling for both total volatility (TotalVol) and a share of aggregate volatility in
total volatility (AggVolCAPM/TotalVol , AggVolFF/TotalVol) as key explanatory variables
in columns 3 and 4, we find that the coefficient of total volatility is positively and
significantly associated with lending rates, whilst the coefficient of aggregate volatility
enters negatively and significantly.
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The use of equity volatility in our analysis relies on a crucial assumption that equity
volatility captures the credit risk associated with the unobserved firm asset volatility.
However, contingent claims model suggests equity volatility is a complex function of
both asset volatility and leverage. A caveat may arise if, although leverage is a source of
firm-specific credit risk, it can amplify or weaken the asset volatility effect and therefore
contaminate the estimated effect of equity volatility (Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Gaul
and Uysal, 2013). For instance, Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that debt holders of
a company with a very small amount of debt are not worried about insolvency even if the
equity is volatile. To better capture the credit risk, we deleverage equity volatility as in
James and Kizilaslan (2014) by a multiplier of equity/(debt+equity), in which equity is
the borrower’s market capitalization and debt is the sum of short term debt and half of
long term debt. We report the results in the last two columns where the unlevered equity
volatilities yield similar results to our baseline regressions. In particular, the coefficient
of unlevered aggregate volatility remains significant and negative, continuing to support
our hypothesis.
The baseline specification may be prone to omitted variable bias if unobserved firm
characteristics drive both firm’s equity volatility and loan spreads. We restructure the
data set into panel data in which we have the cross section unit, i=firm, and the time
series unit, f=facility. We estimate a firm fixed effects model, allowing for arbitrary cor-
relation between the unobserved borrower effect and the observed explanatory variables.
The identification comes from variations in equity volatility and loan spreads within the
same firm. In particular, we compare loan spreads of the same firm across different loans
when equity volatilities differ before the loan origination. The results in the first two
columns of Table 4.5 further confirm the findings that idiosyncratic volatility is positively
priced and aggregate volatility is negatively priced. The weak significance of aggregate
volatility is the result of a short dimension along facilities within the borrower as each
firm borrows on average 2.7 facilities in the sample52.
Likewise, another caveat would arise if unobserved bank characteristics might be
correlated with lending interest rates. For instance, showing that a bank’s stock perfor-
mance during the 1998 crisis predicts the stock performance and probability of failure in
52The information loss arising from the short times series dimension for each cross section unit may
weaken the identification in panel data estimations.
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the recent financial crisis, Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz (2012) suggest that banks’
business model or risk culture may be persistent over time. The unobserved business
model or risk culture may have a non-negligible impact when the bank decides the
loan interest rates. To rule out the effect of unobserved bank characteristics on pricing
patterns, we reorganize the sample into panel data in which b=bank is the cross-section
unit and f=facility is the time series unit. We estimate a bank fixed effects model that
eliminates the unobserved bank specific effects which are heterogenous across lenders
but are constant over facilities of the same lender. Our results largely hold in Columns
3 and 4. The highly statistical significance comes from the fact that each bank lends on
average 30 facilities in the sample.
Taken together, we find that loan spreads are positively associated with idiosyncratic
risk but negatively associated with aggregate risk of the borrower. The lending rate
discount to aggregate risk can be interpreted as evidence of systemic risk-taking in
syndicated loans. In the next section, we investigate the incentives for banks taking
systemic risk.
4.5. Systemic risk-taking and public guarantees: Do non-bank lenders
take systemic risk as well?
Although non-bank institutional investors have been actively participating in the syndi-
cated loan market especially in the leveraged loan segment since 2000, loans originated by
non-bank lenders to publicly traded U.S. nonfinancial companies remained substantially
fewer than similar bank loans53. We collect 1789 loans originated by non-bank insti-
tutional investors, for instance, finance companies, corporations, mutual funds, trust
companies, insurance companies and so forth, which are not protected by public bailout
guarantees54. For comparison, we collect bank loans originated by commercial banks,
bank holding companies, thrifts, savings and loan associations (S&Ls). Because the
status of investment banks and mortgage banks are ambiguous in bailouts in a sense that
53For descriptions of the role of non-bank lenders in the syndicated loan market, see Ivashina and Sun
(2011).
54None of the four insurance companies in our sample, Equitable Life Assurance Society of the US,
Prudential Insurance Co of America, Northwestern National Life, New York Life Insurance Co, are
bailout recipients.
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they are not strictly protected by public guarantee ex-ante but often obtain government
support ex-post in a systemic crisis, we exclude the two types of lenders from the sample.
Table A.2 displays the composition of our sample. One can see the majority of the non-
bank loans come from finance companies.
We report the regression output for the loan pricing patterns by non-bank lenders
and bank lenders in Table 4.6. As the accounting information for non-bank lenders
is not as readily accessible as banks, we only control for borrower and loan specific
variables as well as year dummies55. We find that both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic
risks are priced similarly by non-bank lenders in columns 1 and 3. In particular, the
estimated coefficient for aggregate risk is positive, significant, and slightly greater that
the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk, in line with the prediction of the portfolio theory. In
other words, non-bank lenders charge a risk markup for aggregate risk in the absence of
public guarantees. In columns 2 and 4 the main results that banks charge lower lending
rates to aggregate risk still hold. Overall, given that banks provide lending interest rate
discounts to aggregate risk whereas non-bank lenders charge a significantly positive risk
premium for aggregate risk, we conclude that the key distinction between the two cohorts
of lenders, namely, the coverage of public guarantees, determines pricing patterns and
systemic risk-taking at banks.
One concern may arise that our finding of the different pricing patterns of bank and
non-bank loans could be the result of spurious correlation. For instance, banks serve
observably less risky borrowers whereas non-bank lenders especially finance companies
cater to observably more risky firms (Carey, Post and Sharpe, 1998). This is indeed
reflected in our sample. The first three columns of Table 4.8 summarize the firm-specific
covariates of loans originated by banks and non-bank lenders, respectively. The t-tests
of the sample means suggest that non-bank lenders serve borrowers which have higher
idiosyncratic stock volatility, smaller size, higher leverage and lower profitability.
Although this lending specialization may be one omitted driver of pricing discrepancy,
this caveat is unlikely to bias our findings for two reasons. First, estimating the loan
pricing models for the subsamples of bank loans and non-bank loans separately could
control for this possibility. Second, even if lending specialization affects the selection
55The number of bank loan observations is greater here than in the baseline regression because we
avoid attrition in the procedure of matching loans with bank accounting variables.
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of the riskiness of borrower and therefore loan rates, it can only explain why non-bank
lenders charge positive loan spreads on both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks to risky
borrowers. Albeit it cannot explain the lending rate discount by banks without the
introduction of banking regulation, particularly bailout subsidies.
Nevertheless, matching techniques could be introduced to address this concern of
selection on observables, namely, lenders may select their clients based on borrowers’
characteristics (Tucker, 2010). In particular, we can address the issue of imperfect
comparability of bank and non-bank borrowers by employing propensity score matching.
We take the pool of loans by non-bank borrowers as the treatment group and search for
a control group of loans by bank borrowers which are similar to non-bank borrowers in
all dimensions (based on observable firm controls).
When applying the propensity score matching algorithm, we first estimate a Probit
model to predict the likelihood of a firm to borrow from a non-bank lender. Therefore,
the dependent variable is a dummy which takes 1 if the loan is originated by a non-bank
lender, and 0 if by a bank. The Probit regression includes idiosyncratic and aggregate
risks, firm-specific controls, industry dummies, and year dummies56. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the lender level. The results are presented in column 1 of Table
4.7, which indicates idiosyncratic risk, leverage, profitability and market-to-book value
have significant impacts on the probability of borrowing from a non-bank lender. The p-
value of χ2 test of the model fitness of 0.000 suggests that before matching, firm-specific
variables can explain a significant amount of variations in the choice of lenders. Next,
we use the propensity score to perform a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching.
To avoid bad matches, we impose a tolerance level of 0.05% on the maximum propensity
score distance allowed. In the end, each loan originated by a non-bank lender is matched
to a loan in the control group with the closest propensity score in terms of the borrowers’
characteristics. We end up with 1549 pairs of matched loans57.
Since our identification depends crucially on the conditional independence assump-
tion, which assumes after matching the choice of lender type is randomly assigned, we
56We are unable to match, however, on the lenders’ characteristics which are partially unobservable
for the group of non-bank lenders.
57The number of matched loan is smaller than in Table 4.6 as we impose common support restriction
which drops treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the
minimum propensity score of the controls, and trim (5%) which drops 5% of the treatment observations
at which the propensity score density of the control observations is the lowest. The two restrictions
substantially improve the quality of matching.
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conduct two diagnostic tests to verify this assumption holds. First, we re-estimate the
Probit model restricted to the matched sample in column 2 of Table 4.7. None of
the explanatory variable is significant. Moreover, the p-value of the χ2 test is 0.998,
suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the estimated coefficients
are zero. This supports the validity of conditional independence assumption in the
matched sample. Second, we conduct the univariate comparisons of firms’ characteristics
after matching in the last three columns of Table 4.8. None of the observable differences
of the borrowers is statistically significant. Overall, the diagnostic tests assure that
propensity score matching yields a matched sample which is more homogenous and less
prone to selection bias.
We re-estimate our non-bank versus bank tests in Table 4.9. Despite a drop in sample
size, we obtain similar results as in Table 4.6.
4.6. Too-many-to-fail
We directly test the “too-many-to-fail” argument by assessing the impact of interbank
correlations on loan pricing. The idea is that less correlated banks have stronger in-
centives to increase interbank correlation and therefore take systemic risk in order to
maximize the likelihood of failing together with systemically important banks. Therefore
“too-many-to-fail” argument predicts that less correlated banks charge lower spreads to
aggregate risk compared to more correlated banks58. To measure interbank correlations,
we first calculate the correlation of the bank’s daily excess return with the S&P 500
banking sector index using the data one year prior to the quarter of loan origination.
Since the data of S&P 500 banking sector index start from the Q4 1989, the sample
consisting of 9 321 loans taken out by 3562 firms from 259 publicly listed banks, is
slightly shorter and smaller than the one used in the baseline analysis. We construct
a dummy variable LowCorrBK that equals one if a bank’s interbank correlation is
smaller than the median value and zero otherwise. Interacting the bank correlation with
58This analysis rests on an assumption that ex-ante banks make decisions on lending and pricing,
given the existing loan portfolios and therefore interbank correlations. However, it is possible that a
single loan can affect interbank correlations ex-post, depending on the aggregate exposure and relative
size of the loan amount to bank assets.
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borrowers’ equity volatilities, we estimate the following model:
LoanSpread i ,f ,b,t =c+ α1IdioVol i,t−1 + α2AggVol i,t−1 + α3IdioVol i,t−1 × LowCorrBKb,t−1















The results based on CAPM equity volatilities are presented in column 1 in Table
4.10. We find the idiosyncratic volatility is positively associated with loan spreads,
suggesting that banks charge a risk premium for bearing the firm-specific default risk.
On the contrary, the coefficient of aggregate risk is negative but insignificant. The
interaction term between idiosyncratic volatility and low correlation dummy is positive
and significant. The interaction between aggregate volatility and low correlation dummy
is negative and significant, suggesting that less correlated banks charge lower lending
rates on aggregate risk relative to more correlated banks. Taken together, we find less
correlated banks underprice aggregate risk more relative to more correlated banks.
To relax the restrictions of identical coefficients of the firm, loan and bank specific
covariates for the two subgroups of lowly and highly correlated banks in the baseline
regression, we divide the sample into two corresponding subsamples. The results of
sample split are given in the columns 3 and 5. We find that aggregate risk is negatively
and significantly priced by less correlated banks whereas insignificantly priced by more
correlated banks. This indicates less correlated banks have stronger incentives to take
aggregate risk of borrowers and therefore increase systemic risk. Doing the same exercise
using Fama French equity volatilities, we have similar results in columns 2, 4 and 6.
Overall, we find evidence that less correlated banks have stronger incentives to underprice
aggregate risk and therefore take systemic risk, consistent with the “too-many-to-fail”
story.
Since the test of “too-many-to-fail” based on banks’ stock information may be biased
by sample selection as the sample is restricted to publicly listed banks and excludes
numerous unlisted small banks59. To correct for the sample bias, we also test the
59These are relatively small lenders in the syndicated loan market, but not necessarily small banks in
the absolute terms. The average size of the small banks is 15.9 billion USD.
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hypothesis that smaller banks are more aggressive in systemic risk-taking driven by “too-
many-to-fail”, as suggested by Acharya and Yozulmazer (2007). To test the impact of
bank size on risk pricing, we construct a dummy variable SmallBK that equals one if the
bank size is below the median value, and zero otherwise. The small bank dummy is then
interacted with borrowers’ equity volatilities. Overall, we run the following regression:
LoanSpread i ,f ,b,t =c+ α1IdioVol i,t−1 + α2AggVol i,t−1 + α3IdioVol i,t−1 × SmallBKb,t−1















We present the results in Table 4.11. In column 1, we find banks generally charge a
higher spread for idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient for aggregate risk and the interac-
tion between idiosyncratic risk and SmallBK are negative and insignificant. However,
the interaction term between aggregate risk and SmallBK is negative and significant,
suggesting that small banks underprice aggregate risk relative to big banks. In the end,
the coefficient of SmallBK is positive but insignificant. Overall we find small banks
underprice aggregate risk to idiosyncratic risk more relative to big banks do, indicating
that small banks are more aggressive in taking systemic risk. For sensitivity analysis, we
split the full sample into loans originated by small and big banks and report the results
in columns 3 and 5. Our results continue to hold. The exercises based on Fama French
equity volatilities in columns 1, 4 and 6 yield similar results. Taken together, we find
small banks tend to underprice aggregate risk, which is different from the prediction of
“too-big-to-fail” theory which asserts that large banks are likely to take risk to exploit
the safety net.
4.7. Conclusion
This paper documents evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from loan pricing. We find
loan spreads are positively associated with borrowers’ idiosyncratic risk but negatively
associated with aggregate risk. The lending rate discount for aggregate exposures reveals
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banks’ preference for increased correlation and systemic risk. Relating this collective
moral hazard to the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee in banking regulation, we show that
no evidence of such systemic risk-taking could be found in the loans originated by non-
bank lenders in absence of bailout expectation. In line with the “too-many-to-fail” theory
in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), we find less correlated banks and smaller banks are
more aggressive in systemic risk-taking as they underprice aggregate risk of the borrower
more relative to more correlated banks and larger banks, respectively. The findings also
suggest that the results are not driven by the “too-big-to-fail” guarantee.
Our findings have direct policy implications for macroprudential regulations. First,
the fact that banks take advantage of the financial safety net and pass through regulatory
subsidies to borrowers in the form of inappropriate pricing of risk may threat the stability
of the entire banking sector. The prudential regulation should be designed to force
banks to internalize the social costs incurred in systemic crises so that the incentive for
systemic risk-taking is ameliorated. In particular, banking regulation should operate at
the collective level to pay more attention to systemic risk on top of individual risk to
cope with the collective moral hazard of systemic risk-taking (Acharya, 2009; Farhi and
Tirole, 2009). For instance, systemic risk capital buffer requirement could be introduced
as a policy instrument for macroprudential regulation. One recent example is that the
Dutch central bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), intends to impose an additional
capital buffer requirement on the four systemic banks in the Netherlands. In particular,
this systemic buffer will be 3% of risk-weighted assets for ING Bank, Rabobank and
ABN AMRO Bank, and 1% for SNS Bank. Second, much attention has been paid to
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) which contribute substantially to
systemic risk. However, in this paper we show that small and lowly correlated banks
have been aggressive in taking systemic risk and need attention for regulation as well.
Therefore, extra capital buffer requirement based on asset correlation, which is applied
to every bank as capital requirement based on individual credit risk, could be a desirable
policy instrument for macroprudential regulation.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
No. Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max
LoanSpread 11323 206.819 119.832 20.000 200.000 578.080
Borrower Equity Volatilities
TotalVol 11323 0.575 0.303 0.171 0.500 1.709
MarketVol 11323 0.155 0.064 0.078 0.127 0.398
IdioVolCAPM 11323 0.554 0.303 0.155 0.482 1.697
AggVolCAPM 11323 0.116 0.101 -0.054 0.096 0.529
IdioVolFF 11323 0.545 0.301 0.152 0.470 1.688
AggVolFF 11321 0.154 0.103 0.021 0.129 0.585
BetaCAPM 11323 0.758 0.564 -0.427 0.692 2.471
BetaMKT 11323 0.965 0.624 -0.627 0.945 2.800
BetaSMB 11323 0.833 0.787 -1.030 0.768 3.190
BetaHML 11323 0.294 0.964 -2.593 0.301 3.131
Firm controls
Log(Sales) 11323 5.611 1.729 1.635 5.563 9.847
LEVERAGE 11323 28.035 20.687 0.000 26.606 92.863
PROFMARGIN 11323 -0.871 22.044 -149.972 3.211 28.587
ROA 11323 12.193 11.015 -35.071 12.819 39.983
NWC 11323 21.107 20.804 -28.733 19.291 74.215
TANGIBLES 11323 69.036 36.672 5.675 66.819 177.554
MKTBOOK 11323 1.782 1.072 0.668 1.453 6.815
Loan controls
Log(FacilitySize) 11323 3.805 1.767 -2.996 3.912 10.086
Maturity 11323 3.589 2.098 0.083 3.083 23.000
#Lenders 11323 6.050 7.716 1 3 113
#Facilities 11323 1.763 0.987 1 1 8
REVOLVER 11323 0.730 0.444 0 1 1
TERMLOAN 11323 0.244 0.429 0 0 1
SENIOR 11323 0.999 0.038 0 1 1
SECURED 11323 0.751 0.432 0 1 1
Corporate Purpose 11323 0.228 0.420 0 0 1
Debt Repayment 11323 0.247 0.431 0 0 1
Takeover 11323 0.166 0.372 0 0 1
Working Capital 11323 0.127 0.333 0 0 1
Other Purpose 11323 0.233 0.422 0 0 1
Bank controls
SizeBK 11323 11.269 1.878 6.220 11.315 14.358
CapitalBK 11323 7.524 1.940 3.594 7.247 14.886
ROABK 11323 0.952 0.580 -1.693 1.037 2.215
ZscoreBK 11323 3.179 0.464 0.888 3.249 4.033
NPLBK 11323 0.936 1.022 0.000 0.556 4.912
LiquidityBK 11323 18.716 8.573 3.925 18.150 46.141
LoanGrowthBK 11323 20.476 38.342 -35.727 9.191 199.013
CostOfFundBK 11323 3.390 1.653 0.522 3.313 10.520
InterbankCorr 9321 0.735 0.161 -0.267 0.778 0.980
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Table 4.2: Baseline regression CAPM
In all specifications, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations.
The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. We use equity volatilities estimated from CAPM
regressions. In column 1, we include equity volatilities only as explanatory variables. In column 2, we
add firm specific variables as controls. In column 3, we further add loan specific variables as controls. In
column 4, we include bank specific variables as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the
lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote coefficients significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IdioVolCAPM 216.469*** 129.264*** 92.632*** 91.788***
(9.008) (7.195) (6.113) (6.108)
AggVolCAPM -173.098*** -54.640*** -40.841*** -42.850***
(20.374) (15.442) (14.337) (14.273)
Log(Sales) -20.732*** -6.497*** -6.010***
(1.234) (0.897) (0.924)
LEVERAGE 0.984*** 0.667*** 0.676***
(0.081) (0.066) (0.061)
PROFMARGIN 0.100 0.107 0.107
(0.101) (0.080) (0.079)
ROA -1.589*** -1.587*** -1.517***
(0.235) (0.167) (0.142)
NWC -0.249*** -0.251*** -0.257***
(0.074) (0.065) (0.064)
TANGIBLES -0.130*** -0.029 -0.036
(0.041) (0.032) (0.032)




































Constant 171.445*** 312.103*** 421.445*** 490.482***
(12.735) (13.282) (36.335) (40.460)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 11,323 11,323 11,323 11,323
Adjusted R-squared 0.340 0.439 0.557 0.561
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Table 4.3: Baseline regression Fama French
In all specifications, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. The
dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. We use equity volatilities estimated from Fama French
regressions. In column 1, we include equity volatilities only as explanatory variables. In column 2, we
add firm specific variables as controls. In column 3, we further add loan specific variables as controls. In
column 4, we include bank specific variables as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the
lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote coefficients significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IdioVolFF 230.749*** 134.597*** 96.190*** 95.415***
(8.474) (6.953) (5.917) (5.878)
AggVolFF -172.813*** -54.616*** -38.262** -39.739**
(20.038) (16.470) (16.248) (16.329)
Log(Sales) -20.628*** -6.495*** -6.018***
(1.248) (0.905) (0.933)
LEVERAGE 0.981*** 0.665*** 0.674***
(0.082) (0.067) (0.062)
PROFMARGIN 0.102 0.109 0.110
(0.100) (0.079) (0.079)
ROA -1.590*** -1.586*** -1.517***
(0.232) (0.166) (0.141)
NWC -0.240*** -0.246*** -0.252***
(0.074) (0.065) (0.064)
TANGIBLES -0.130*** -0.028 -0.036
(0.041) (0.033) (0.032)




































Constant 178.400*** 314.396*** 423.049*** 491.838***
(13.451) (13.320) (36.406) (40.430)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 11,321 11,321 11,321 11,321
Adjusted R-squared 0.342 0.440 0.557 0.561
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Table 4.4: Robustness checks
In columns 1 and 2 we use equity betas as alternative proxies for aggregate exposure
of the borrower. In columns 3 and 4 we use total volatility and share of aggregate
volatility in total volatility. In columns 5 and 6 we use unlevered equity volatilities.
The dependent variable in all specifications is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients.
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.























Constant 486.443*** 490.052*** 499.646*** 508.313*** 522.334*** 523.795***
(40.229) (40.339) (40.588) (40.419) (39.942) (39.711)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,323 11,323 11,323 11,321 11,323 11,321
R-squared 0.563 0.563 0.565 0.566 0.547 0.547
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Table 4.5: Panel Regressions
In columns 1 and 2 we run panel regressions with firm fixed effects. In columns 3 and
4 we run panel regressions with bank fixed effects. The dependent variable in the all
specifications is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the
borrower level in the first two columns and at the lender level in the last two columns
and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote coefficients significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Firm FE Bank FE
CAPM Fama French CAPM Fama French









Constant 450.41*** 453.02*** 421.12*** 423.61***
(63.45) (63.50) (65.56) (66.00)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 11,323 11,321 11,323 11,321
Number of Firms 4,192 4,191
Adjusted R-squared 0.332 0.332 0.494 0.494
Number of Banks 376 376
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Table 4.6: Non-bank and Bank Lenders
In all specifications, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid
observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients.
***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Non-bank Bank Non-bank Bank









Constant 475.108*** 490.106*** 477.457*** 491.353***
(97.732) (43.211) (96.464) (43.167)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,796 12,233 1,793 12,231
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.541 0.341 0.541
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Table 4.7: Prematch propensity score regression and postmatch diagnostic regression
In all specifications, we run Probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy for
loans originated by non-bank lenders. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the
lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote coefficients
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.























Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 14,027 3,098
p-value of χ2 0.000 0.998
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.007
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Table 4.8: T-test for equality of means of borrowers’ characteristics before and after
matching
We compare the sample means of borrowers’ characteristics before and after propensity
score matching. ***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Unmatched sample Matched sample
Variables Bank Nonbank Difference in means Bank Nonbank Difference in means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IdioVolCAPM 0.558 0.820 -0.262*** 0.738 0.740 -0.002
AggVolCAPM 0.116 0.111 0.004* 0.112 0.114 -0.002
IdioVolFF 0.550 0.811 -0.262*** 0.729 0.731 -0.002
AggVolFF 0.155 0.168 -0.013*** 0.165 0.164 0.001
Log(Sales) 5.576 5.101 0.475*** 5.064 5.158 -0.094
LEVERAGE 28.159 33.894 -5.735*** 31.805 32.611 -0.806
PROFMARGIN -0.937 -9.762 8.825*** -8.848 -8.925 0.077
ROA 12.108 5.039 7.069*** 6.341 6.328 0.013
NWC 21.037 19.003 2.034*** 21.118 19.995 1.123
TANGIBLES 69.483 69.894 -0.411 68.629 69.151 -0.522
MKTBOOK 177.004 150.679 26.324*** 157.242 155.430 1.812
Observations 12233 1796 14091 1549 1549 3098
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Table 4.9: Non-bank and Bank Lenders: A propensity score matched sample
In all specifications, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid
observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients.
***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Non-bank Bank Non-bank Bank









Constant 638.863*** 443.294*** 636.691*** 442.001***
(95.358) (56.447) (94.545) (55.935)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,549 1,549 1,546 1,549
Adjusted R-squared 0.354 0.463 0.354 0.463
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Table 4.10: Loan pricing and bank correlation
In all specifications, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid
observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients.
***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Full Sample Lowly Corr. Banks Highly Corr. Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IdioVolCAPM 88.374*** 88.011*** 102.139***
(9.153) (8.592) (11.185)
AggVolCAPM -12.847 -63.378*** -21.722
(17.994) (20.406) (16.592)
IdioVolCAPM × LowCorrBK 14.552*
(8.077)
AggVolCAPM × LowCorrBK -55.901**
(26.457)
IdioVolFF 90.164*** 93.192*** 105.670***
(8.523) (8.965) (10.348)
AggVolFF -13.441 -63.119*** -25.506
(19.839) (23.248) (17.938)
IdioVolFF × LowCorrBK 18.337**
(7.948)




Constant 495.228*** 494.023*** 478.592*** 478.047*** 442.636*** 643.520***
(51.926) (51.687) (116.247) (115.420) (65.557) (59.925)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,321 9,319 4,658 4,657 4,663 4,662
Adjusted R-squared 0.572 0.572 0.592 0.592 0.564 0.564
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Table 4.11: Loan pricing and bank size
In all specifications, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid
observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients.
***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Full Sample Small Banks Large Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IdioVolCAPM 106.381*** 77.827*** 113.753***
(7.175) (6.790) (9.287)
AggVolCAPM -14.694 -68.752*** -15.842
(17.420) (15.183) (16.011)
IdioVolCAPM × SamllBK -22.469***
(7.944)
AggVolCAPM × SamllBK -57.116***
(21.621)
IdioVolFF 107.643*** 84.200*** 115.264***
(6.843) (7.205) (8.834)
AggVolFF -10.540 -70.544*** -12.817
(19.713) (16.467) (19.074)
IdioVolFF × SamllBK -17.628**
(7.847)




Constant 506.037*** 508.423*** 468.019*** 471.263*** 465.321*** 463.777***
(48.045) (48.045) (57.554) (57.743) (77.704) (77.367)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,323 11,321 5,655 5,654 5,668 5,667
Adjusted R-squared 0.562 0.562 0.517 0.517 0.581 0.581
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APPENDIX
Table A.1: Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable Description Source
LoanSpread The All-in-Drawn spread is an interest rate
spread over LIBOR measured in basis points
for each dollar drawn from the loan.
Dealscan
IdioVolCAPM Idiosyncratic volatility using one factor
CAPM regressions. Defined as the standard
deviation of the residual.
CRSP
AggVolCAPM Systematic volatility using one factor CAPM
regressions. Defined as the product of beta
and market volatility.
CRSP
IdioVolFF Idiosyncratic volatility from Fama French
three-factor model. Defined as the standard
deviation of the residual.
CRSP, WRDS
AggVolFF Systematic volatility from Fama French
three-factor model. Defined as the total
volatility that is attributable to Fama French
factors and the factors cross-covariances.
CRSP, WRDS
BetaCAPM Equity beta estimated from the CAPM
regression.
CRSP
BetaMKT Coefficient of the market factor estimated
from the Fama French three-factor model.
CRSP
TotalVol Total equity volatility, defined as the
standard deviation of daily excess return one
year before the facility start date.
CRSP
UnleveredIdioVolCAPM Idiosyncratic volatility using one factor
CAPM regressions, unlevered by multiplying
a ratio of equity/(debt+equity).
CRSP and
Compustat
UnleveredAggVolCAPM Systematic volatility using one factor CAPM




UnleveredIdioVolFF Idiosyncratic volatility from Fama French
three-factor model, unlevered by multiplying
a ratio of equity/(debt+equity).
CRSP, WRDS and
Compustat
UnleveredAggVolFF Systematic volatility from Fama French
three-factor model, unlevered by multiplying
a ratio of equity/(debt+equity).
CRSP, WRDS and
Compustat
Log(Sales) Logarithm of firm sales at close of the
borrower.
Dealscan
LEVERAGE Firm leverage defined as sum of long term
and short term debts over total assets of the
borrower.
Compustat
PROFMARGIN Profit margin over sales of the borrower. Compustat
ROA Return on assets of the borrower. Compustat
NWC Net working capital over total assets of the
borrower.
Compustat
TANGIBLE Tangible assets over total assets of the
borrower.
Compustat
MRTBOOK Market to book ratio of the borrower. Compustat
Log(FacilitySize) Logarithm of facility amount in million USD. Dealscan
MATURITY Maturity of the facility in terms of years Dealscan





#Facilities Number of facilities (tranches) in a
syndicated loan deal
Dealscan
REVOLVER Dummy for lines of credit. Dealscan
TERMLOAN Dummy for term loans. Dealscan
SENIOR Dummy for senior loans. Dealscan
SECURED Dummy for loans with collateral. Dealscan
Corporate Purpose Loan purpose dummy indicates loans
borrowed for corporate purpose.
Dealscan
Debt Repayment Loan purpose dummy indicates loans
borrowed for debt repayment.
Dealscan
Takeover Loan purpose dummy indicates loans
borrowed for takeover.
Dealscan
Working Capital Loan purpose dummy indicates loans
borrowed for working capital.
Dealscan
Other Loan purpose dummy indicates loans
borrowed for purposes other than the
previous four.
Dealscan
SizeBK Logarithm of bank total assets of the lender. Call reports, FR
Y-9C
SmallBK Dummy for small banks. Call reports, FR
Y-9C
CapitalBK Bank equity over total assets of the lender. Call reports, FR
Y-9C




ZscoreBK Bank Z score, defined as sum of equity asset
ratio and ROA divided by standard deviation
of ROA. We use 8-quarter rolling window
when calculating the standard deviation of
ROA. We take log transformation as in
Laeven and Levine (2009).
Call reports, FR
Y-9C
ROABK Return on assets of the lender. Call reports, FR
Y-9C
LiquidityBK Liquid assets over total assets of the lender. Call reports, FR
Y-9C
CostOfFundBK Cost of funds, defined as total interest
expenses over total liabilities of the lender.
Call reports, FR
Y-9C
LoanGrowthBK Growth rates of gross loans of the lender. Call reports, FR
Y-9C
InterbankCorr Interbank correlation, defined as the
correlation between bank stock return and
S&P 500 bank sector index.
CRSP, Datastream
LowCorrBK Dummy for less correlated banks of which
interbank correlation is below median value.
CRSP, Datastream
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Table A.2: Institutional types of non-bank and bank lenders
Lender Types No. of facilities No. of borrowers No. of lenders
Panel A Non-banks
Corporation 31 22 17
Finance Company 1,704 930 161
Inst. Invest. Other 8 7 7
Insurance Company 13 8 4
Mutual Fund 1 1 1
Other 25 23 15
Specialty 1 1 1
Trust Company 7 6 3
Total 1,789 984 211
Panel B Banks
US Bank 12,130 4,402 567
Thrift or S&L 103 51 7
Total 12,233 4,453 574
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